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policies describe them as obstructions to the operation of federal immigration
law. This premise is flawed. On the better view, the sanctuary movement
comports with, rather than fights against, dominant new themes in federal
immigration law. A key theme—emerging both in judicial doctrine and onthe-ground practice—focuses on maintaining legitimacy by fostering
adherence to equitable norms in enforcement decision-making processes.
Against this backdrop, the sanctuary efforts of cities, churches, and
campuses are best seen as measures necessary to inject normative (and
sometimes legal) accuracy into real-world immigration enforcement
decision-making. Sanctuaries can erect front-line equitable screens, promote
procedural fairness, and act as last-resort circuit breakers in the
administration of federal deportation law. The dynamics are messy and
contested, but these efforts in the long run help ensure the vindication of
equity-based legitimacy norms in immigration enforcement.
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INTRODUCTION
Jeanette Vizguerra, an undocumented immigrant from Mexico, has
been living in the United States since 1997 and has three U.S. citizen
children. 1 A traffic stop led to the issuance of a deportation order against her
in 2011. She was able, however, to obtain stays of removal from Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE), allowing her to remain in the United States
on a temporary basis. Because Vizguerra was the victim of a serious crime
and helpful to law enforcement in pursuing the perpetrator, she obtained a
certification from law enforcement that made her eligible for “U status,” a
statutory dispensation that puts certain crime victims on a pathway to lawful

1 Donie O’Sullivan & Sara Weisfeldt, Undocumented Mom Taking Sanctuary in Denver Church Is
Among Time’s 100 Most Influential People, CNN (Apr. 20, 2017, 2:05 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/04/20/us/vizguerra-time-100-trnd/index.html
[https://perma.cc/F3M7GRFX].
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immigration status. Nevertheless, on February 15, 2017, less than one month
after President Trump’s inauguration, ICE declined any further stay. It took
this action notwithstanding Vizguerra’s pending U application, two decades
of productive residence, and the far-reaching harm her removal would have
on her dependent U.S. citizen children. Vizguerra’s congregation
immediately offered her sanctuary, physically sheltering her from removal. 2
She lived in the church building for three months while negotiations for
leniency continued on her behalf. 3 Eventually, ICE capitulated, agreeing to
extend her stay of removal until March 15, 2019, thus allowing her to remain
with her family while awaiting agency adjudication of her U application. 4
Vizguerra’s precarious situation is not unique. Across the United States,
immigration enforcement in 2017 took a sharp turn in a less nuanced and
more draconian direction. Few deportable noncitizens now can expect to
benefit from favorable enforcement discretion, even if they lack a criminal
record and have made positive contributions to their community, or if their
removal would cause substantial suffering to themselves or their families.5
Taxpaying breadwinners who have lived in the country for decades have
suddenly found themselves detained far from family. 6 Noncitizen survivors
of domestic violence seeking protective orders, as well as immigrant parents
in child support or custody disputes, have been arrested by ICE just outside
2 See Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., ICE, to Field Officer Dirs. et al., ICE, Enforcement
Actions at or Focused on Sensitive Locations (Oct. 24, 2011), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/erooutreach/pdf/10029.2-policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/8J96-TLGL] (indicating that as a policy matter ICE
will not enforce immigration law in “sensitive locations” such as churches).
3 Melissa Etehad, Denver Mother Is Granted Temporary Deportation Relief After 3 Months of
Sanctuary in a Church, L.A. TIMES (May 13, 2017, 3:05 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/lana-denver-mother-relief-20170512-story.html [https://perma.cc/8J96-TLGL] (describing efforts by
politicians and her congregation to obtain a reprieve from ICE).
4 Id. Due to a 10,000 per year cap on U visas, there is currently a multi-year backlog in processing.
8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(2)(A) (2012); U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., NO. OF FORM I-918,
PETITION FOR U NONIMMIGRANT STATUS, BY FISCAL YEAR, QUARTER, AND CASE STATUS 2009–2017
(2017),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/
Immigration%20Forms%20Data/Victims/I918u_visastatistics_fy2017_qtr4.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
M7XA-PTC4].
5 See generally Jason A. Cade, The Challenge of Seeing Justice Done in Removal Proceedings,
89 TUL. L. REV. 1, 9–13 (2014) (discussing the statutory grounds that make noncitizens deportable for a
wide range of immigration violations and crimes, with little opportunity for formal discretionary relief).
6 See, e.g., Liz Robbins, Once Routine, Immigration Check-Ins Are Now High Stakes, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr.
11,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/11/nyregion/ice-immigration-check-indeportation.html [https://perma.cc/67G9-69D2]; Tracy Seipel, Deported: End of the Line for
Undocumented Oakland Couple, MERCURY NEWS (published Aug. 16, 2017, 4:39 PM; updated Mar. 29,
2018,
12:03
PM),
https://www.mercurynews.com/2017/08/16/deported-end-of-the-line-forundocumented-oakland-couple [https://perma.cc/9DAE-P7BJ] (reporting on ICE’s refusal to exercise
favorable discretion in the case of a Mexican couple without criminal records deported after living in the
U.S. for over two decades, working in construction and nursing, paying taxes, and raising four children,
now in high school and college).
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the courtroom door. 7 Noncitizens arrested for minor offenses have been put
in removal proceedings even before they have had an opportunity to contest
the criminal charges. 8 Even immigrants with clear paths to lawful status are
routinely detained. 9 In 2017, immigration arrests of noncitizens without
criminal histories more than doubled, while immigration arrests generally
rose by 42%. 10
What precipitated this dire situation for noncitizens? In short, a
changing of the guard. When the Trump Administration came to power early
in 2017, it quickly made every potentially deportable noncitizen a removal
priority. 11 In sharp contrast to the efforts of prior administrations, the new
Administration abandoned the premise of equitable prosecutorial
discretion. 12 The Administration trumpets this blanket, indiscriminate
approach to enforcement as a “return to [the] rule of law.” 13 As then-

7 See, e.g., Jonathan Blitzer, The Trump Era Tests the True Power of Sanctuary Cities, NEW YORKER
(Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-trump-era-tests-the-true-power-ofsanctuary-cities [https://perma.cc/L9QA-5XUG]; Nora Caplan-Bricker, “I Wish I’d Never Called the
(Mar.
19,
2017,
8:12
PM),
Police,”
SLATE
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/cover_story/2017/03/u_visas_gave_a_safe_path_to_ci
tizenship_to_victims_of_abuse_under_trump.html [https://perma.cc/QMQ5-96UU]; Jennifer Medina,
Too Scared to Report Sexual Abuse. The Fear: Deportation., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/30/us/immigrants-deportation-sexual-abuse.html
[https://perma.cc/Z9MP-AEKE].
8 Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed.
Reg. 8,793, 8,793–94 (Jan. 30, 2017) (“It is the policy of the executive branch to . . . detain individuals
apprehended on suspicion of violating Federal or State law . . . .”); Maria Sacchetti, ICE Immigration
Arrests of Noncriminals Double Under Trump, WASH. POST (Apr. 16, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/immigration-arrests-of-noncriminals-double-undertrump/2017/04/16/98a2f1e2-2096-11e7-be2a-3a1fb24d4671_story.html [https://perma.cc/724F-9TDS]
(documenting 75% rise in number of detainer requests ICE sought for arrested noncitizens);
Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin McAleenan, Acting
Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al., Enforcement of the Immigrant Laws to Serve the National
Interest (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Enforcementof-the-Immigration-Laws-to-Serve-the-National-Interest.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UEX8-5DDT]
[hereinafter Kelly, Priorities Memo] (expanding immigration priorities to include noncitizens who have
been arrested but not yet convicted).
9 See, e.g., Maria Cramer, ICE Arrested 7 People as They Sought Permanent Status in Mass., R.I.,
BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2018/02/21/january-ice-arrestedpeople-they-sought-permanent-status-mass-and-rhode-island/EE4jLM6HkytwrHDUjYpdqL/story.html
[https://perma.cc/AD5W-23EB].
10 ICE, FISCAL YEAR 2017 ICE ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT 2–3, 5 (2017),
https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2017/iceEndOfYearFY2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6QF7-QVSS].
11 See Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, Exec. Order No. 13,767,
82 Fed. Reg. 8,793; Kelly, Priorities Memo, supra note 8.
12 See infra Part II.
13 Press Release No. 17-889, Dep’t of Justice, Return to Rule of Law in Trump Administration
Marked by Increase in Key Immigration Statistics (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
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Secretary of Homeland Security John Kelly put it, “[i]f you’re here illegally,
you should leave or you should be deported, put through the system.” 14 In
December 2017, Acting Director of ICE Thomas Homan affirmed the
Administration’s continued commitment to this approach: “There’s no
population off the table. If you’re in this country illegally, we’re looking for
you and we’re going to look to apprehend you.” 15
In the face of this mass, indiscriminate federal enforcement, sites of
resistance have risen throughout the country. Hundreds of jurisdictions have
passed or strengthened so-called “sanctuary” policies, which limit local
government employees’ cooperation in the federal immigration enforcement
process and in some cases provide services to potentially deportable
noncitizens. 16 Religious organizations, too, have taken up this cause, gaining
visibility as institutions willing to shelter and assist individuals caught up by
harsh deportation policies. 17 Sanctuary campuses—public or private
institutions of higher education with policies limiting cooperation or
information-sharing with federal immigration authorities—are also on the
rise. 18
Critics charge that sanctuary policies present a threat to law and order,
unlawfully obstruct enforcement, endanger the public, protect lawbreakers,
and encourage further immigration violations. 19 One of President Trump’s
return-rule-law-trump-administration-marked-increase-key-immigration-statistics
[https://perma.cc/
LM2C-PYAP].
14 Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast Apr. 16, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-thepress/meet-press-april-16-2017-n747116 [https://perma.cc/9K7U-N8Z8]. On July 31, 2017, John Kelly
was appointed Chief of Staff to the Trump Administration, vacating his position as DHS Secretary, which
he had held since January 20, 2017. Dan Merica, Kelly Sworn In as Trump’s Second Chief of Staff, CNN
(July 31, 2017, 10:17 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/07/31/politics/john-kelly-chief-ofstaff/index.html [https://perma.cc/NU6N-7ZUQ].
15 Adam K. Raymond, Deportations Are Down Under Trump, but Arrests of Non-Criminal
Immigrants Surge, N.Y. MAG: DAILY INTELLIGENCER (Dec. 20, 2017), http://nymag.com/daily/
intelligencer/2017/12/deportations-are-down-as-immigration-arrests-surge.html
[https://perma.cc/
6KW9-A6PS]; see also Kery Murakami, Immigrant Deportations Up Sharply Under Trump, MANKATO
FREE PRESS (Aug. 19, 2017), http://www.mankatofreepress.com/news/local_news/immigrantdeportations-up-sharply-under-trump/article_a2b7b8d3-d00b-5839-9f1d-8de5d83b3696.html [https://
perma.cc/G757-6R9R] (reporting ICE’s statement that the agency is no longer exercising leniency with
respect to undocumented residents who have not committed weighty crimes).
16 See infra Section III.A.
17 See infra Section III.B.
18 See infra Section III.C.
19 See, e.g., Rafael Bernal, Sessions Rips ‘Culture of Lawlessness’ in Chicago, HILL (Aug. 7, 2017,
6:39
PM),
http://thehill.com/latino/345668-sessions-rips-culture-of-lawlessness-in-chicago
[https://perma.cc/KEV2-2ZH9] (reporting on Attorney General Jeff Sessions’s statement that “the
political leadership of Chicago has chosen deliberately and intentionally to adopt a policy that obstructs
this country’s lawful immigration system”); see also Michael J. Davidson, Sanctuary: A Modern Legal
Anachronism, 42 CAP. U. L. REV. 583, 612 (2014) (making a similar argument and citing sources).
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first executive orders, for instance, asserted that “sanctuary jurisdictions . . .
willfully violate Federal law in an attempt to shield aliens from removal.” 20
Even those who are generally sympathetic to sanctuaries sometimes describe
their efforts and objectives as rooted in the obstruction of governing law—
most prominently as a form of civil disobedience directed at an unduly harsh
immigration system, pursued in the name of a “higher” (i.e., religious or
moral) law. 21 The usual storyline is simple: immigration enforcers are trying
to carry out legal commands, while sanctuary efforts are undertaken to
impede the law. 22
In this Article, I argue that this frame is too facile. The better view is
that sanctuary efforts function not as legal obstructions but as engines
furthering critical legal norms in the face of the Executive Branch’s
indiscriminate enforcement policies. To explain why, however, requires
grappling with the deep complexities of immigration law. The significance
of sanctuary policies in the current immigration enforcement crackdown
cannot be fully appreciated without an understanding of the broader
historical and statutory context of immigration law. For most of the twentieth
century, immigration judges were empowered to set aside a deportable
noncitizen’s removal when warranted by the equities. This power was seen
as necessary to avoid grave injustice in individual cases. 23 Statutory
provisions enacted in the 1990s, however, dramatically expanded the kinds
of criminal offenses and immigration violations that would lead to
deportation, while at the same time constricting the back-end discretionary
authority of adjudicators to provide relief from these increasingly onerous
sanctions. 24 In this period, Congress also created a variety of mechanisms
that allowed federal enforcers in the Department of Homeland Security
20 Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg.
8,799 (Jan. 30, 2017); see also Paul Bedard, ICE Chief Lists Worst Sanctuary Cities: Chicago, NYC, San
EXAMINER
(July
24,
2017,
7:27
AM),
Francisco,
Philadelphia,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/ice-chief-lists-worst-sanctuary-cities-chicago-nyc-san-franciscophiladelphia [https://perma.cc/P6XK-G7YQ] (describing sanctuary cities as “un-American” because they
“harbor[] criminal illegal immigrants”).
21 See, e.g., Rose Cuison Villazor, What Is a “Sanctuary”?, 61 SMU L. REV. 133, 140–41 (2008)
(describing the “morally-based arguments of the sanctuary movement” as in conflict with the “rule-oflaw principle that the federal government sought to employ”).
22 Cf. Barbara Bezdek, Religious Outlaws: Narratives of Legality and the Politics of Citizen
Interpretation, 62 TENN. L. REV. 899, 911 (1995) (“This rendition of Sanctuary as law-breaking protest
evokes a familiar picture and, for many Americans, not a terribly troubling narrative of maintaining social
order through the rule of law in the world’s premier democracy.”).
23 See infra Part I.
24 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546; Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L.
No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, 40 & 42 U.S.C.);
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978.
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(DHS) to remove many categories of noncitizens from the purview of
immigration court altogether, thus authorizing fast-track proceedings
presided over solely by enforcement officials. 25 The cumulative result of
these changes was a removal code of unprecedented harshness and rigidity,
with cruel consequences that soon began to make headlines.26
And yet, removing equitable discretionary authority from adjudicators
did not excise it from the system altogether. 27 The exercise of equitable
discretion by enforcers remained a necessary component to ensure the
system continued to comport with basic justice. 28 Indeed, for over sixteen
years, across both Republican and Democratic administrations, federal
enforcers were deeply engaged in the process of developing and refining
equitable enforcement policies. 29 Across that same time period, the Supreme
Court issued a variety of rulings that not only acknowledged the necessity of
enforcement-based system equity, but increased the opportunities for
discretionary interventions by enforcers. 30
Political and judicial branches have engaged in this project of equitable
enforcement—despite the apparent statutory rigidity of modern immigration
law—because the immigration system is unique among civil enforcement
fields with respect to the gravity of benefits and sanctions it administers.
Indeed, deportation often threatens life-destroying consequences for
noncitizens and their families. Such a system demands that the individual
human beings who face such dire consequences be afforded some measure
of equitable discretion—what I have described in previous articles as
“immigration equity” 31—in keeping with basic principles of fairness,
equality, and proportionality. If not at the back end, these concerns must be
25 See Jennifer Lee Koh, Removal in the Shadows of Immigration Court, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 181,
193–98 (2017); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Rise of Speed Deportation and the Role of Discretion,
5 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 6–7, 22–25 (2014).
26 See, e.g., Joseph Ditzler, Detentions Spark Protest, ALBUQUERQUE J., Dec. 31, 2001, at 1; Gayda
Hollnagel, Immigration Sweeps Disrupt Small Towns, Separate Families, WIS. ST. J., Dec. 25, 1997, at
1C,
https://madison.newspaperarchive.com/madison-wisconsin-state-journal/1997-12-25/page-19
[https://perma.cc/8CS3-NS4G]; Anthony Lewis, Congress Needs to Restore Humanity to U.S.
Immigration Policy, NAPLES DAILY NEWS, Dec. 22, 1997, at D07; Eric Lipton, Shoplifting Gets Woman
Kicked out of Country, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Dec. 21, 1999, at A01; Nancy Lofholm, INS
Doubles Staff for Colorado Crackdown, DENVER POST, Dec. 30, 1999, at A01; Marianne Means,
Deportations Putting Public at Some Risk, TIMES UNION (Albany), Dec. 22, 1997, at A7.
27 See infra Section I.B.
28 See infra Section I.C.
29 See infra Part II.
30 See infra Section I.D.
31 See Jason A. Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 661, 664–65 (2015)
[hereinafter Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity]; Jason A. Cade, Judging Immigration Equity:
Deportation and Proportionality in the Supreme Court, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1029 (2017) [hereinafter
Cade, Judging Immigration Equity].
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realized in early stages of immigration-related decision-making. 32 Thus, the
structure of deportation law mirrors criminal law, where prosecutorial
discretion has long been recognized as necessary to ensure individual justice
in the face of overbroad criminal codes. 33
When federal agencies fail to adequately undertake this equitable
responsibility—instead engaging in mass, indiscriminate enforcement—
justice is not reliably meted out, jeopardizing the legitimacy of the
deportation system. Legitimacy encompasses both legal accuracy (ensuring
that deportations are not contrary to federal law) and normative accuracy
(ensuring that equitable factors are weighed before deportation is rigidly
applied in individual cases). 34 While there obviously cannot be a one-sizefits-all rule for the proper equitable result in all deportation cases, previous
administrators worked to develop detailed standards to guide agency
officials. 35 The Trump Administration’s wholesale disregard of the
responsibility to equitably enforce the law has led and will continue to lead
to unjust and arbitrary consequences in many cases. As a result, the locus of
discretion shifts further upstream, to the local police, state prosecutors, and
other nonfederal institutions in local communities, including churches and
campuses. Some of these actors have chosen courses of action that promote
equitable norms in the operation of immigration enforcement. Sanctuaries, I
argue, have helped the system incorporate some fairness into real-life
immigration decision-making, achieving results that are normatively more
accurate.
Depending on the type of sanctuary measure at issue, these legitimizing
forces may take hold at different stages of the enforcement process.
Municipalities and campuses with limited-cooperation policies, for instance,
impose an “equitable screen” at the front end of the system. The federal
immigration system has long relied on criminal justice actors to identify and
process “undesirable” noncitizens. 36 By declining to turn noncitizens over to
federal authorities, sanctuary communities operate something like normative
grand juries, refusing to indict except where aggravating factors are
32 See Jason A. Cade, Return of the JRAD, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 36 (2015) (arguing that
Department of Homeland Security officials should defer to signals by criminal court judges that
deportation would not be appropriate in particular cases).
33 See infra Section I.B.
34 See infra Part IV; cf. Josh Bowers, Probable Cause, Constitutional Reasonableness, and the
Unrecognized Point of a “Pointless Indignity,” 66 STAN. L. REV. 987, 1019–21 (2014) (explaining the
difference between legal accuracy and moral accuracy).
35 See Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 31, at 708 (“The point is that some balancing
should take place in individual cases, even for ‘criminal noncitizens,’ to safeguard against injustice and
arbitrary action in the removal system.”); infra Part II.
36 See infra Section IV.A.
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present. 37 These screening measures bear other legitimacy-enhancing
consequences, too. Of particular importance, cooperation-limiting measures
bolster the ability of noncitizens and citizens alike to engage in certain
protected aspects of family and civic life without illegitimate intrusion by
federal or state immigration enforcers. 38
Cities and churches that provide support and legal representation to
persons in detention or removal proceedings help hold the government to its
burden of proof and improve the likelihood that eligibility for lawful status
or defenses to removal will be fairly considered. 39 Sanctuaries can also play
the role of a last-resort circuit-breaker. 40 The physical refuge provided to
Jeanette Vizguerra in Denver illustrates this dynamic. The provision of true
sanctuary—in the literal, historically familiar sense—shielded her from
immediate removal after formal processes had run out, allowing negotiation
on her behalf that ultimately led ICE to permit her to remain in the country
while her application for U status proceeds.
The various forms of sanctuary that I consider in this Article spring
from a range of motivations, implicate different legal rules, and vary in
effectiveness. 41 Each of them, however, has the potential to inject
legitimizing dynamics into the current immigration enforcement landscape.
As a result of sanctuary activities, some individual noncitizens who should
not be deported will be spared. The policies will enable even more
individuals to engage in constitutionally protected civic life, to the wider
benefit of their families and communities. Together, these outcomes will
help foster at least localized tonics against growing immigrant cynicism
regarding the legitimacy of the immigration enforcement system, and by
extension, its criminal system adjuncts. 42 Meanwhile, the high visibility of
sanctuary efforts, along with the credibility of the particular institutions
involved, will help shape opinion and influence public discourse nationally,
perhaps generating broader support for more humane immigration policies
in the future. 43
By focusing on the functions that different sanctuary forms share in the
context of mass immigration enforcement, I provide a unifying account of
37

See infra Section IV.A.
See infra Section IV.D.
39 See infra Section IV.B.
40 See infra Section IV.C.
41 See infra Parts III, V.
42 See Emily Ryo, Fostering Legal Cynicism Through Immigration Detention, 90 S. CAL. L. REV.
999, 1003 (2017) (exploring how the punitive, arbitrary, and inscrutable nature of the immigration
detention system as experienced by noncitizens can lead to deep and widespread distrust of the legal
system).
43 See infra Section IV.E.
38
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public and private defensive sanctuary efforts, which thus far have been
considered for the most part in isolation. 44 More importantly, I make the case
that sanctuary efforts comport with deep-rooted principles of justice,
including equity-based principles vindicated repeatedly in modern Supreme
Court rulings concerning immigration enforcement.
This Article develops these points in five Parts. Part I outlines the
significant transition that has occurred in immigration law and enforcement
in recent decades, moving away from formal equitable adjudication toward
the empowerment of nonadjudicators in determining whether deportation
law is administered fairly and proportionally. I explain why faithful
execution of the immigration scheme requires attention to this equitable
responsibility, and I show that the Supreme Court has endorsed the necessity
of this new enforcement-based system of equity, issuing rulings designed to
facilitate consideration of proportionality and fairness by both federal and
local actors.
Part II reviews how recent administrations have dealt with the need to
undertake this equitable task. As I explain, immigration agencies began to
implement prosecutorial discretion policies during the George W. Bush
Administration in response to the emerging deleterious consequences of
Congress’s new statutory regime. Immigration agencies continued to refine
these discretionary approaches for a decade and a half, and that process
gained significant momentum during President Obama’s first term. The
Trump Administration, in contrast, has sought to displace this reified system
of equitable enforcement discretion with a radically new system, one
characterized by a mass, indiscriminate approach to immigration
enforcement.
Part III describes the three primary subfederal entities engaged in
sanctuary activity: cities, churches, and campuses. For each form, I briefly
touch on the most salient legal justifications for the various activities, but
only to make the point that each is likely on sufficiently solid legal footing
to weather challenges from the federal officials who oppose them. I turn to
my larger argument in Part IV, explaining that the emergence of all these
forms of sanctuary activity should be viewed as the latest development in the
upstream relocation of immigration law equity. Stepping into the equitable
void left by the Executive Branch, sanctuaries are generating new ways of
injecting a measure of salutary equitable discretion into real-world
deportation processes. Because sanctuaries, at bottom, promote fairness and
justice in immigration-related decision-making, they have a strong claim to
44 For an exception, see Rose Cuison Villazor & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Sanctuary Networks,
MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3038943
[https://perma.cc/RS9Y-NW2F].
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legitimacy in light of immigration law’s overarching and judicially
recognized context. In Part V, I address some of the limitations and
drawbacks of relying on sanctuary policies for equity in immigration
enforcement. To be sure, the positive effects that sanctuaries offer in
achieving immigration equity are limited in efficacy and reach. Even so, in
both the short-term and long-term, sanctuaries can make a positive
difference. This Article concludes by suggesting possibilities for the future
of the sanctuary movement and the role courts might play in protecting
immigration equity’s last stand.
I.

OVERBROAD REMOVAL GROUNDS REQUIRE EQUITABLE
ENFORCEMENT DECISION-MAKING
A. The Shift to Statutory Severity

In the late twentieth century, Congress set into motion a radical
restructuring of immigration enforcement and the deportation scheme. 45
Through extensive changes to the immigration code, 46 Congress vastly
increased the number of lawfully present noncitizens subject to deportation
on the basis of even minor criminal history, 47 made all unauthorized presence
a deportable offense, and barred most paths to lawful status for noncitizens
who entered without inspection unless they first depart the country, which in
turn typically triggers a ten-year prohibition on lawful return. 48 At the same
time, Congress tightly constrained the authority of administrative
immigration judges and criminal sentencing judges to exercise the equitable

45

Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 31, at 671–83; Adam B. Cox & Cristina M.
Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 463 (2009).
46 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546; Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L.
No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, 40 & 42 U.S.C.).
47 See, e.g., Lopez-Valencia v. Lynch, 798 F.3d 863, 867 (9th Cir. 2015) (concerning the appeal of a
forty-two-year-old lawful permanent resident who had lived in the country for forty years and was
deported as an “aggravated felon[]” after shoplifting a $2 can of beer). See generally 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2) (2012) (listing many categories of crimes that make lawfully present noncitizens
deportable); Jason A. Cade, The Plea-Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court,
34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1751, 1758–63 (2013) (discussing the statutory provisions that make lawfully
present noncitizens deportable on the basis of even minor crimes).
48 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (noncitizens who enter without inspection are inadmissible and
therefore cannot adjust lawful status); id. § 1227(a)(1)(B) (noncitizens present without authorization are
deportable); id. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i) (ten-year reentry bar for noncitizens previously present in the United
States without authorization for one year or more; three-year reentry bar if the period of unlawful presence
was between 181 and 364 days).
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discretionary powers they had employed for most of immigration law’s
history to avoid unjust or disproportionate removals. 49
Today, few statutory provisions allow undocumented noncitizens to
avoid deportation on humanitarian or equitable grounds. Such relief is
available only to those who (1) have very long residence in the United States,
no disqualifying criminal record, and immediate U.S. citizen family
members who would suffer “exceptional and extremely unusual” hardship
by the noncitizen’s removal; 50 or (2) are victims of trafficking, abuse, or
other specified serious crimes in the United States and can meet other
criteria. 51 Moreover, Congress created numerous mechanisms permitting the
fast-track removal of large categories of noncitizens without any formal
immigration proceedings at all.52 Finally, amendments to the immigration
code in the 1990s greatly expanded the use of immigration detention,
mandating or permitting immigration authorities to employ detention in a
wide variety of circumstances, including many situations that have little or
no bearing on the underlying assessment of risk that would typically justify
the deprivation of liberty. 53
49 See generally Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (discussing the elimination of 212(c) and
the Judicial Recommendation Against Deportation, as well as other constrictions of adjudicative relief
from removal); Cade, supra note 32, at 40–41 (discussing the statutory measures for equitable discretion
in immigration enforcement before and after Congress’s statutory changes in the 1990s).
50 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)–(b) (addressing cancellation of removal for both lawful permanent
residents (LPRs) and noncitizens without lawful status). For purposes of eligibility for cancellation of
removal, the required periods of continuous presence are deemed to end upon commission of criminal
offenses or the inception of removal proceedings. Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 31, at
677–78 (explaining the limitations of cancellation of removal provisions); see also Margaret H. Taylor,
What Happened to Non-LPR Cancellation? Rationalizing Immigration Enforcement by Restoring
Durable Relief from Removal, 30 J.L. & POL. 527, 540–42 (2015) (discussing how the statutory annual
cap of 4000 grants of cancellation for non-LPRs created a backlog, significantly forestalling the
effectiveness of such relief).
51 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T) (trafficking victims); id. § 1101(a)(15)(U) (victims of designated
serious crimes who assist law enforcement); id. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (juveniles dependent on family court
due to parental abuse, neglect, or abandonment). Asylum is another statutory form of humanitarian relief
but is exceedingly difficult to obtain, as it requires the noncitizen to apply within one year of entry to the
United States and to prove a likelihood of torture or persecution by the government of his country of
origin on account of race or another protected ground, among other restrictions and requirements. See id.
§ 1158.
52 See DANIEL KANSTROOM, AFTERMATH: DEPORTATION LAW AND THE NEW AMERICAN DIASPORA
52–67 (2012) (identifying a “bewildering array of . . . fast-track mechanisms” for removal); Koh, supra
note 25, at 193–221 (describing five types of removal orders that occur in “immigration court’s
shadows”); Wadhia, supra note 25, at 22–25 (describing expedited removal, reinstatement of removal,
and administrative removal as instances of “speed deportation”).
53 See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C § 1225(a), (b)(2)(A) (requiring
detention of noncitizens seeking admission who are “not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be
admitted”); id. § 1226(c) (providing that immigration officials “shall take into custody any alien who [is
inadmissible or deportable on most criminal grounds] . . . when the alien is released”); id. § 1231(a)(2),
(a)(6) (requiring detention for up to ninety days following a removal order and authorizing continued
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Cumulatively, these changes wrought a deportation system that now
subjects many millions of long-term noncitizens to the possibility of
detention and removal, including lawful permanent residents who have only
minor criminal histories, with limited opportunities for judges to consider
whether these severe sanctions are justified in individual cases. Frequently,
the collateral consequences of a deportation extend far beyond the
individual, including the separation of a caregiver from a U.S. citizen spouse
or children and a variety of direct and indirect economic losses. 54 In the
Supreme Court’s words, “deportation may result in the loss of all that makes
life worth living.” 55
The legislative constriction of immigration and sentencing judges’
authority to set aside removal, however, does not necessarily remove all
consideration of fairness and proportionality from the system. Instead, when
adjudicative discretion contracts, such considerations shift to other parts of
the system. 56 Perhaps paradoxically, the Executive’s duty to faithfully
execute the law in the immigration context requires attention and
responsiveness to individual equitable circumstances rather than rote

detention beyond that period on a discretionary basis). See generally Farrin R. Anello, Due Process and
Temporal Limits on Mandatory Immigration Detention, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 363, 365 (2014) (discussing
the implementation of mandatory and discretionary immigration detention); Cade, Judging Immigration
Equity, supra note 31, at 1029, 1082–92 (same); César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Naturalizing
Immigration Imprisonment, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1449 (2015) (same).
54 See RANDY CAPPS ET AL., URBAN INST. & MIGRATION POLICY INST., IMPLICATIONS OF
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES FOR THE WELL-BEING OF CHILDREN IN IMMIGRANT FAMILIES
(2015) (explaining the psychological trauma, economic hardship, and instability experienced by the
children of immigrant parents due to workplace raids and other enforcement activities); JOANNA DREBY,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, HOW TODAY’S IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT POLICIES IMPACT CHILDREN,
FAMILIES, AND COMMUNITIES: A VIEW FROM THE GROUND 2 (2012) (addressing the consequences of
deportation for those left behind, such as single mothers who struggle to provide for their families and
the detrimental effect on children’s health and mentality); see also Sibylla Brodzinsky & Ed Pilkington,
US Government Deporting Central American Migrants to Their Deaths, GUARDIAN (Oct. 12, 2015, 8:57
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/oct/12/obama-immigration-deportations-centralamerica [https://perma.cc/9AM6-SYKD] (analyzing data regarding deportees killed upon return to the
violent countries they fled); Eline de Bruijn, Deportation Was a ‘Death Sentence’ for Austin Father Sent
(Sept.
20,
2017),
Back
to
Mexico,
Lawyer
Says,
DALL. MORNING NEWS
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/texas/2017/09/20/man-fled-mexico-fear-gangs-killed-deportedaustin-wife-says [https://perma.cc/G4A9-59G8]; Sarah Elizabeth Richards, How Fear of Deportation
Puts Stress on Families, ATLANTIC (Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/family/
archive/2017/03/deportation-stress/520008 [https://perma.cc/X8WP-97HW] (examining the effects of
deportation-related anxiety on families, especially children who can suffer stress severe enough to inhibit
development, leading to mental, emotional, and cognitive disabilities).
55 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945) (internal quotation marks omitted).
56 Cade, Judging Immigration Equity, supra note 31, at 1038 (“As with squeezing a balloon, the
contraction of judicial authority to wield equitable discretion has expanded the role of police and
prosecutorial discretion in evaluating and extending relief to noncitizens based on their individual
circumstances.”).
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application of rigid code law. In the following Sections, I elaborate on this
claim.
B. Deportation Laws Are Not Designed for Rigid Enforcement
Formal code law is only one ingredient in the complex admixture that
creates a legal regime. As Dean Roscoe Pound observed over a century ago,
there is always a gap between “law in books” and “law in action.” 57
Enforcement priorities, resource constraints, constitutional limitations,
political will, and other factors have as much to say about how a particular
field is regulated as black letter statutes. Lawmakers, knowing this reality,
enact many laws without the anticipation of full enforcement, allowing (and
often counting on) calibration and refinement through on-the-ground
implementation. 58 This tempering process is particularly evident, and
necessary, in fields that administer severe penalties, where harsh legislation
is politically advantageous but can wreak great injustice in particular cases. 59
Legislators have political incentives to increase the severity of criminal laws,
for example, relying on police and prosecutors to exercise discretion in
determining whom to arrest and prosecute. 60 Enacting broad, inflexible penal
57 Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 34 (1910) (“[T]he law upon
the statute books will be far from representing what takes place actually . . . .”); see also William J. Stuntz,
The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 521 (2001) (“Broad [criminal] codes
cannot be enforced as written; thus, the definition of the law-on-the-street necessarily differs, and may
differ a lot, from the law-on-the-books.”).
58 See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 87 (2d prtg.
1970) (arguing that “legislation has long been written in reliance on the expectation that law enforcement
officers will correct its excesses through administration”); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea
Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1963 (1992) (arguing that legislators intend that prosecutors
will “exercise their discretion not to pursue habitual criminal sentencing for offenders who [fall] within
the statute but seem[] not to deserve such harsh treatment”); cf. Ehud Guttel & Doron Teichman, Criminal
Sanctions in the Defense of the Innocent, 110 MICH. L. REV. 597, 601–07 (2012) (citing evidence that
legislators sometimes act based on awareness or assumptions about correlations between statutory
severity, prosecutorial choices, and likelihood of conviction).
59 Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute,
110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1664–65 (2010) (“Legislators pass broad and deep criminal codes not only to
appear tough on crime, but also for efficiency’s sake: They seek to leave determinations of optimal
enforcement to the executive. They purposefully avoid the particulars, anticipating case-specific, backend equitable intervention.” (footnote omitted)); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Ham Sandwich Nation: Due
Process When Everything Is a Crime, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 102, 102–03 (2013) (describing
examples of public criticism and legislative responses when prosecutors fail to exercise the tremendous
discretion delegated to them by broad penal legislation in equitably appropriate ways); Stuntz, supra note
57, at 569–79 (“[T]here are two keys to legislative incentives in this area—prosecutors’ ability to decline
to charge, and prosecutors’ incentive to charge only those whom the public wishes to see charged.”).
60 See DAVIS, supra note 58, at 87; Scott & Stuntz, supra note 58, at 1963; William J. Stuntz, Unequal
Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1974 (2008) [hereinafter Stuntz, Unequal Justice] (“[C]riminal justice
policies are mostly political symbols or legal abstractions, not questions the answers to which define
neighborhood life.”).
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statutes and mandatory sentencing guidelines thus transfers equitable power
to police and prosecutors, who act as the criminal system’s normative
gatekeepers. 61 The acceptability and expectation of executive
underenforcement of penal law for reasons of justice has roots reaching back
to the early days of the Republic. 62
In the immigration context, Congress has delegated vast enforcement
authority through both formal and indirect means. 63 As an initial matter,
specific statutory provisions afford wide latitude to DHS to determine
enforcement priorities. 64 But even without those vague delegations, Congress
effectively transferred a great deal of gatekeeping power to the deportation
system’s enforcers when it expanded the grounds for removal while
narrowing adjudicative discretionary authority. 65 About 11 million persons
are present in the United States without authorization, and many hundreds of
thousands more are lawfully present but potentially deportable for civil or
criminal offenses. 66 The development of this large unauthorized population
can be explained, in part, by longstanding political acquiescence under both
Republican and Democratic administrations, including a century of
economic reliance on migrants from Mexico for cheap labor. 67 Even as laws
and attitudes about undocumented workers and immigration enforcement
have become more stringent, Congress’s growing budgetary appropriations
61 WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3–4 (2011) (“Law
enforcers . . . define the laws they enforce.”); see also ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE
POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 154–57 (2007); Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor’s Discretion
in the United States, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 532, 533 (1970); Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges,
Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1422 (2008).
62 Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 716–48
(2014). Professor Price provides evidence that between 1801 and 1828, federal district attorneys
terminated roughly a third of federal prosecutions as an exercise of prosecutorial discretion, with judicial
acquiescence, and discusses correspondence between high-ranking federal government officials directing
nonprosecution in cases where mitigating factors demanded equity. Id.; see also Stith, supra note 61, at
1422 (arguing that Congress “has created a system of criminal laws that requires—and has always
required—the exercise of discretion”).
63 See Cade, supra note 32, at 53–54 (discussing congressional delegation of authority to the
Executive to determine immigration enforcement priorities).
64 See 6 U.S.C. § 202(5) (2012) (charging the Secretary of Homeland Security with “[e]stablishing
national immigration enforcement policies and priorities”); 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2012) (conferring
broad power to the Secretary of Homeland Security over “the administration and enforcement of this
chapter and all other laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens”).
65 Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 31, at 679–81; Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 45,
at 464, 518–19.
66 Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Population Stable for Half a Decade,
PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 21, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/21/unauthorizedimmigrant-population-stable-for-half-a-decade [https://perma.cc/HZ6F-29AY].
67 HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 19–55 (2014). As Professor Motomura
has explained, there has always been a large population of noncitizens living and working without
authorization in the U.S. Id. at 24–25, 172–74.
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in recent years to the immigration agencies have enabled the removal of only
a small fraction of the total number of noncitizens who may be deportable
on the basis of unlawful presence, criminal history, or other infractions. 68
The confluence of these factors works to delegate tremendous de facto
discretionary enforcement power. Thus, although the Obama Administration
actualized more than 2.5 million removals—far more than any other
administration in history—many of these reflected the prioritization of
border enforcement actions and the use of summary procedures for recent
entrants or persons previously removed, representing but a drop in the bucket
relative to the size of the pool of possible enforcement targets living within
the interior United States. 69
Because Congress enacted broad and rigid statutory provisions against
the backdrop of this long history of underenforcement, without
commensurate increases in funding, there are undeniable practical limits on
any administration’s capability to enforce the law on the books. Legislators
cannot realistically have expected the new rules to be fully enforced.70 In
other words, Congress tacitly or implicitly relies on the Executive Branch to
set priorities and exercise equitable discretion when determining which
percentage of the total removable population to target.
Deportation laws thus present a variation of what Professor Michael
Gilbert labels “insincere rules,” which are statutes or regulations designed to
achieve a result that is less than co-extensive with the literal letter of the
law. 71 Insincere rules are everywhere, from speed limits to environmental
standards to criminal laws to tax regulation.72 The basic idea is that by
overshooting with rules on the books, lawmakers hope to get something close
to what they actually want with rules in action. Professor Gilbert argues that
68 Furthermore, Congress’s immigration enforcement appropriation acts have typically provided that
DHS prioritize among noncitizens deportable on the basis of criminal history. See, e.g., Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, 128 Stat. 5, 251; Consolidated Security, Disaster
Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-329, 122 Stat. 3574, 3659.
69 Koh, supra note 25, at 184 (citing statistics that over 83% of removals in recent years were through
expedited procedures that bypass immigration court); Serena Marshall, Obama Has Deported More
People Than Any Other President, ABC NEWS (Aug. 29, 2016, 2:05 PM),
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/obamas-deportation-policy-numbers/story?id=41715661
[https://perma.cc/53M4-26PJ].
70 See supra notes 59–64 and accompanying text; see also Michael D. Gilbert, Insincere Rules,
101 VA. L. REV. 2185 (2015) (arguing that legal rules can be intentionally insincere); Zachary S. Price,
Law Enforcement as Political Question, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1571, 1605 (2016) (“[O]nce
widespread nonenforcement becomes practically inevitable, Congress may enact laws with the
expectation that they will not be fully enforced; and by the same token, it may choose not to devote
legislative effort to narrowing or repealing existing laws that would be deeply unpopular if fully enforced,
precisely because those laws’ nonenforcement reduces the urgency to update them.”).
71 Gilbert, supra note 70, at 2205.
72 Id. at 2186.
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as the cost of enforcement within a particular field increases, the gap between
desired behavior and legislated restrictions is also likely to widen.73 Greater
sanctions will be necessary to achieve general compliance whenever
enforcement is very costly, in terms of either resources or political will.74
Given the historically sporadic enforcement of deportation rules and the
practical impossibility of attempting to remove more than 11 million
presumptively deportable immigrants, the severity of immigration penalties
may be roughly calibrated to achieve a measure of general deterrence desired
by Congress.
Indeed, when media accounts began highlighting stories about the
Immigration and Naturalization Service’s (INS) indiscriminate enforcement
against long-time lawful permanent residents of the harsher statutory
provisions enacted in 1996, many of the legislators who had voted for the
revisions wrote a letter to the Attorney General urging more systematic
prosecutorial discretion in order to avoid “unfair” deportations and
“unjustifiable hardship.” 75 The twenty-eight bipartisan cosigners of the letter
could not understand “why the INS pursued removal in such cases when so
many other more serious cases existed.” 76 This letter is not law, but it helps
substantiate this account of the insincerity of modern deportation rules.
The bottom line is that, with immigration law, as in many other areas
of regulatory enforcement, there is an understood—and intended—gap
between “law in books” and “law in action.” 77 For the reasons I have stated,
one can confidently infer that Congress counted on immigration enforcers to
shape and temper the rigidity of the removal provisions.
C. Proportionality and Fairness Require Equitable Enforcement
Even if one believes that Congress desired rigid and absolute
enforcement of its harsh statutory rules, this view would not justify an
indiscriminate approach to deportation. The removal system imposes dire,
life-altering penalties on the basis of a broad range of civil and criminal
infractions, while providing few formal avenues to set aside these
consequences in the balance of equities. I have argued elsewhere at length
73

Id. at 2205.
Id. at 2209–10, 2213 (“Precisely because enforcement capacity is limited, rule-makers have an
incentive to adopt demanding, insincere rules.”).
75 Letter from Twenty-Eight Members of the U.S. House of Representatives to Janet Reno, Attorney
Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, and to Doris M. Meissner, Comm’r, INS (Nov. 4, 1999),
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/991104congress-letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/
X6M7-RH54] [hereinafter Letter to Reno]. The INS was the predecessor agency to DHS, which was
created in 2003.
76 Id.
77 Pound, supra note 57, at 21; Mila Sohoni, Crackdowns, 103 VA. L. REV. 31, 49 (2017).
74
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that proportionality and basic fairness require that enforcement decisions
account for equitable considerations and afford noncitizens facing removal
adequate due process. 78 Here I will briefly summarize the main points.
Immigration officials have a responsibility to be “minister[s] of
justice,” and seek normatively correct outcomes. 79 Equitable discretion is
necessary to implement the deportation scheme fairly, with attention to
disproportionate consequences in individual circumstances. “[I]mmigration
enforcement obligations do not consist only of initiating and conducting
prompt proceedings that lead to removals at any cost. Rather, as has been
said, the government wins when justice is done.” 80 DHS agents and attorneys
are not exempted from this obligation; instead, they are “duty-bound to ‘cut
square corners’ and seek justice rather than victory.” 81 Even where the
foreign national lacks any current path to lawful status, basic justice
sometimes demands the use of prosecutorial discretion in order to avoid
overly severe sanctions. 82
Any legal scheme that administers consequences as significant as
deportation should reflect the principle of proportionality. Proportionality
refers to the fit between the gravity of the underlying offenses, tempered by
any mitigating factors, and the severity of the sanction. 83 To be sure, there is
no universal agreement about the point at which a given penalty becomes
disproportionate. 84 Nevertheless, most lawyers, scholars, and jurists accept
that enforcers or enforcement systems should be sensitive to egregiousness,

78 Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 31; Cade, Judging Immigration Equity, supra
note 31; Jason A. Cade, Policing the Immigration Police: ICE Prosecutorial Discretion and the Fourth
Amendment, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 180 (2013) [hereinafter Cade, Policing the Immigration
Police]; Cade, supra note 32.
79 See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013); Josh
Bowers, Annoy No Cop, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 129 (2017) (making a similar argument about other law
enforcers); Margaret H. Lemos, Accountability and Independence in Public Enforcement 25 (Duke Law
Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Series No. 2016-23, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2748720 [https://perma.cc/86VY-KN8S] (arguing that because enforcement actions
typically lack judicial oversight, “enforcers are not just advocates for one side; they have substantial
responsibility for deciding what outcome is fair and just, all things considered”).
80 Matter of S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722, 727 (B.I.A. 1997).
81 Kang v. Attorney Gen., 611 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 2010).
82 DAVIS, supra note 58, at 25 (“Discretion is a tool, indispensable for individualization of justice.”).
83 See Austin Lovegrove, Proportionality Theory, Personal Mitigation, and the People’s Sense of
Justice, 69 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 321, 330 (2010) (“[T]he severity of the punishment should be proportionate
to the seriousness of the offence in question; but it also should be appropriate, having regard to the
offender’s personal mitigation.”); Michael J. Wishnie, Immigration Law and the Proportionality
Requirement, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 415, 416 (2012) (“Proportionality is the notion that the severity of a
sanction should not be excessive in relation to the gravity of an offense.”).
84 Bowers, supra note 79, at 142 (“There is no obvious answer to the question of when the state has
criminalized too much, too hard.”).

450

113:433 (2018)

Sanctuaries as Equitable Delegation

mitigating factors, and hardship. 85 Because a commitment to proportionality
recognizes that there is no “invariant, objective deserved punishment for
each offensive act,” as Professor Stephen Morse has written, no statute can
possibly be just in all its applications. 86 Professor Lawrence Solum similarly
observed that “the infinite variety and complexity of particular fact situations
outruns our capacity to formulate general rules.” 87 In turn, this inability to
create rules precise and flexible enough to avoid normative error means that
“it is justice itself, not a departure from justice, to use equity’s flexible
standard.” 88 We need, and have always needed, equitable correction of rigid
rules. At some point, the gap between the consequences of deportation for
an affected individual and the nature of the underlying circumstances
becomes too wide, raising proportionality problems.
Government agents charged with meting out life-altering sanctions on
a large scale must be “responsive to the unique circumstances of individual
transgressions.” 89 Persons—citizens and noncitizens alike—who commit
civil and criminal violations fall along “a vast spectrum of human character
and behavior,” and treating them all the same can work great injustice for
those who had “made single mistakes or had shown genuine rehabilitation
and remorse.” 90 Moreover, in any given removal enforcement situation, the
noncitizen may have established deep bonds of family, faith, employment,
85

See, e.g., Angela M. Banks, The Normative and Historical Cases for Proportional Deportation,
62 EMORY L.J. 1243, 1663–71 (2013); Jason A. Cade, Judicial Review of Disproportionate (or
Retaliatory) Deportation, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1427, 1449–72 (2018) (outlining possibilities for
increased judicial scrutiny of deportation on various constitutional grounds); Kyron Huigens, Virtue and
Inculpation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1423, 1445 (1995); Wishnie, supra note 83, at 418–24 (collecting and
discussing authorities).
86 Stephen J. Morse, Justice, Mercy, and Craziness, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1485, 1493 (1984) (reviewing
NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1982)); see also DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT
AND MODERN SOCIETY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL THEORY 1 (1990) (arguing that legislated sanctions fall short
of societal expectations because “we have tried to convert a deeply social issue into a technical task for
specialist institutions”).
87 Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging,
34 METAPHILOSOPHY 178, 206 (2003); see also ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 133 (David
Ross trans., J. L Ackrill & J. O. Urmson rev. ed., 1998) (explaining that “about some things it is not
possible to make a universal statement which shall be correct” and that therefore when it is necessary for
the law “to speak universally, but not possible to do so correctly, the law takes the usual case, though it
is not ignorant of the possibility of error”).
88 Martha C. Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 83, 93–96 (1993).
89 MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC
SERVICES 15 (1980) (“[S]ociety seeks not only impartiality from its public agencies but also compassion
for special circumstances and flexibility in dealing with them.”); see also KANSTROOM, supra note 52, at
219 (arguing that because European law requires balancing of private and public interests in deportation
cases, the system “preserves an important measure of respect for human rights norms and a powerful
safeguard against arbitrary government actions”).
90 David A. Martin, Graduated Application of Constitutional Protections for Aliens: The Real
Meaning of Zadvydas v. Davis, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 64.
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and friendship. In such cases, deportation results in extreme consequences,
“both for that individual and for the family members, persons, and
institutions at the other end of those connections.” 91 Thus, when enforcers
blindly apply overbroad and formally inflexible rules, they do “not merely
fail to do justice, they may do positive injustice.” 92
Agents charged with faithfully carrying out the law—including federal
enforcers—must consult not only statutory text but also context. 93 Adherence
to context includes consideration of the entire legislative plan, constitutional
constraints, and rule-of-law commitments such as notice, consistency, and
procedural justice. 94 In Professor Margaret Lemos’s words, “‘good’
enforcement is not the same thing as maximum enforcement.” 95 These
considerations have led Professor Mila Sohoni to persuasively argue that the
President’s constitutional obligation to faithfully execute the law96 is violated
by a “crackdown” approach to enforcement. 97 But one need not find a
constitutional hook, however, to agree that all branches of the government
engaged in the enforcement of any area of the law must strive to follow, and
promote, ideals of fairness and justice. Rigidly enforcing any law to the
fullest extent possible is likely to violate this obligation—perhaps
particularly so with respect to the drastic sanction of deportation.
D. The Supreme Court’s Embrace of Upstream Equity
The previous Sections explained that, in the immigration context,
Congress’s expansion of deportability grounds and contraction of back-end
adjudicative equity provisions shifted power and responsibility to federal
enforcers and subfederal actors to evaluate and implement proportionality

91 Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 31, at 709; see also Banks, supra note 85, at
1293–96 (discussing social science literature documenting the collateral consequences of deportation for
family members left behind).
92 Roscoe Pound, Discretion, Dispensation and Mitigation: The Problem of the Individual Special
Case, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 925, 928 (1960); see also DAVIS, supra note 58, at 25 (“Rules alone, untempered
by discretion, cannot cope with the complexities of modern government and of modern justice.”).
93 Sohoni, supra note 77, at 83.
94 Id. (“Whether she be judge or mayor, a faithful interpretive agent properly consults not only text,
but also context, ‘the legislative plan,’ the public interest, constitutional rules, and commitments to ruleof-law values such as fair notice and procedural justice.” (footnote omitted)). But cf. David S. Rubenstein,
Taking Care of the Rule of Law, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 168, 205 (2018) (arguing that the relevant
context for rule-of-law evaluations depends on which frames and facts are selected).
95 Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 705 (2011); see
also Jonathan H. Adler, Stand or Deliver: Citizen Suits, Standing, and Environmental Protection,
12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 39, 62 (2001) (“Optimal enforcement is nearly always less than complete
enforcement.”).
96 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 5 (the President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”).
97 Sohoni, supra note 77, at 48–49.
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concerns at the front-end stages of the process. 98 In recent years, the Supreme
Court has come to grips with the new reality of enforcement-based equity in
the deportation system. In fact, concerns about the system’s potential for
disproportionality appear to have influenced much of the Court’s recent
jurisprudence in this area. 99 In Arizona v. United States, for example, the
Court directly acknowledged that equity in the deportation scheme today
depends almost entirely on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Justice
Kennedy’s opinion for the majority explained that a “principle feature of the
removal system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration
officials.” 100 It is worthwhile to appreciate the clarity of the Court’s
understanding—and endorsement—of the connection between federal
agencies’ exercise of prosecutorial discretion and the implementation of
equity in the deportation system:
Federal officials, as an initial matter, must decide whether it makes sense to
pursue removal at all. . . . Discretion in the enforcement of immigration law
embraces immediate human concerns. Unauthorized workers trying to support
their families, for example, likely pose less danger than alien smugglers or
aliens who commit a serious crime. The equities of an individual case may turn
on many factors, including whether the alien has children born in the United
States, long ties to the community, or a record of distinguished military
service. . . . Returning an alien to his own country may be deemed inappropriate
even where he has committed a removable offense or fails to meet the criteria
for admission. 101

The Court in Arizona thus acknowledged that not all noncitizens made
deportable by Congress are similarly situated, and that, as a result, executive
enforcement officials should weigh “immediate human concerns” in
determining the appropriateness of removal in particular cases, even where
code law would seem to mandate removal. 102 The Court found most of
Arizona’s state-level immigration enforcement laws preempted, despite their
mirroring of federal law provisions. 103 I have previously argued that the
98

Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 45, at 518–19 (“Prosecutorial discretion has . . . overtaken the
exercise of discretion by immigration judges when it comes to questions of relief.”).
99 Cade, Judging Immigration Equity, supra note 31, at 1041–82 (demonstrating that the Court’s
immigration enforcement jurisprudence since 2001, across a range of substantive and procedural
challenges, increases or preserves structural opportunities for equitable balancing at multiple levels in the
deportation process).
100 567 U.S. 387, 396 (2012).
101 Id.
102 See generally Cade, Judging Immigration Equity, supra note 31, at 1042–49 (explaining that the
Court’s conception of noncitizen membership in the U.S. community is broader than current code law).
103 See Adam B. Cox, Enforcement Redundancy and the Future of Immigration Law, 2012 SUP. CT.
REV. 31, 34–41 (explaining that state laws mirrored on federal laws are typically constitutional).
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Court’s concerns about proportionality in the removal system help explain
its departure from typical preemption analysis in Arizona. 104 In so ruling, the
Court thereby protected federal discretionary authority to forebear
removal—whether through individual discretionary decisions or as a result
of macro enforcement policies—from unwanted state interference.
Building on this upstream-equity doctrine, the Court has also issued a
series of decisions that enable subfederal actors to take actions likely to
minimize the chance of negative immigration outcomes. 105 In Padilla v.
Kentucky, for example, the Supreme Court endorsed the idea that front-line
actors in the criminal justice system should take into account the harshness
and inflexibility of immigration law and make adjustments when charging,
plea bargaining, and sentencing. 106 The Court’s watershed holding in that
case—that the Sixth Amendment requires criminal defense counsel to render
effective advice about the potential immigration consequences of a
conviction—was firmly rooted in the new realities of federal immigration
law, including the evisceration of opportunities for leniency in the face of
criminal convictions. 107 Justice Stevens’s majority opinion noted that the
grounds of criminal removal were narrow for much of the 20th century, and
he zeroed in on the fact that “immigration reforms over time have expanded
the class of deportable offenses and limited the authority of judges to
alleviate the harsh consequences of deportation.” 108 Justice Stevens
emphasized the recent loss of mitigating mechanisms at both federal and
state levels, which he described as “critically important . . . to minimize the
risk of unjust deportation.” 109 As a result, “the drastic measure of
deportation . . . is now virtually inevitable for a vast number of noncitizens
convicted of crimes.” 110 It would be constitutionally unfair, the Court
reasoned, to allow persons to plead guilty without being aware that the
104 See Cade, Judging Immigration Equity, supra note 31, at 1046 (arguing that the Arizona Court’s
“newfound acknowledgment of the role of enforcement-driven proportionality in the deportation system
helps explain its preemption rulings”); cf. Lucas Guttentag, The Forgotten Equality Norm in Immigration
Preemption: Discrimination, Harassment, and the Civil Rights Act of 1870, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 1, 4 (2013) (“Courts should revitalize the equality norm in deciding whether a particular state
immigration provision impedes federal interests or hinders federal goals.”).
105 See Cade, Judging Immigration Equity, supra note 31, at 1049–93 (analyzing approximately
fifteen years of the Supreme Court’s recent deportation jurisprudence to argue that “[a]cross a diverse set
of legal issues, the cases evince a deep concern with the sweep of the statute, especially with respect to
minor offenses leading to removal, detention, or to the inability to access discretionary relief”).
106 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010).
107 Relying on erroneous advice from his attorney, Jose Padilla (a long-time lawful permanent
resident) pled guilty to a criminal charge that all but guaranteed his deportation. Id. at 359; id. at 387–88
(Alito, J., concurring).
108 Id. at 360 (majority opinion).
109 Id. at 361, 368 (emphasis added).
110 Id. at 360 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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penalty of deportation or other serious immigration consequences would
follow. 111
Most important for present purposes was the Court’s explicit
recognition that equitable discretion in the removal system has shifted to
earlier enforcement stages and encouragement of defense attorneys and
prosecutors to take immigration consequences into account by “plea
bargaining creatively” to avoid disproportionate results. 112 Padilla thus
established and endorsed a structure for state and local actors to negotiate
plea deals that help noncitizen defendants avoid unjust removals, or that at
least preserve narrow possibilities for consideration of equitable
discretionary relief in later deportation proceedings. 113
In another recent series of cases, the Court has required and refined a
“categorical approach” to determining the immigration consequences of
convictions. 114 In general, these cases have rejected the federal government’s
efforts to expansively interpret the categories of crimes that lead to
deportation in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), instead requiring
a strict categorical match between the elements of the penal offense that the
noncitizen was convicted of and the relevant immigration statutory

111 Convictions can also result in immigrant detention, inadmissibility, and lengthy bars to lawful
reentry to the United States. Cade, Plea Bargain Crisis, supra note 47, at 1758–63, 1809–11.
112 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 373. While Padilla by itself did not constitutionally mandate that the parties
negotiate around unjust removals, the Court’s subsequent decisions in two other plea bargain cases, Lafler
v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012), and Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012), at least suggest the possibility
that defendants are constitutionally entitled to the going rate for plea deals in their jurisdiction. See Josh
Bowers, Plea Bargaining’s Baselines, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1083, 1105 (2016); Jenny Roberts,
Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2650, 2660–65 (2013). Thus, at least in localities
where immigration-specific plea bargaining becomes standard practice, defense attorneys who fail to
competently engage in such bargaining may run afoul of the Sixth Amendment. Andrés Dae Keun Kwon,
Defending Criminal(ized) “Aliens” After Padilla: Toward a More Holistic Public Immigration Defense
in the Era of Crimmigration, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1034, 1062–65 (2016) (arguing that after Padilla, Lafler,
and Frye, “defenders arguably have an affirmative duty to seek an immigration-safe plea and avoid or
mitigate negative immigration consequences”); Roberts, supra, at 2668.
113 See Heidi Altman, Prosecuting Post-Padilla: State Interests and the Pursuit of Justice for
Noncitizen Defendants, 101 GEO. L.J. 1, 7 (2012) (arguing that Padilla also encourages prosecutors to
agree to immigration-safe consequences in appropriate cases); Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for
Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1151 (2013)
(discussing various prosecutorial policies that benefit noncitizen defendants); Robert M. A. Johnson, A
Prosecutor’s Expanded Responsibilities Under Padilla, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 129, 130 (2011)
(same); Kwon, supra note 112, at 1100–01 (same); see also Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. 257, 269 (2012)
(noting that defense attorneys might help noncitizens who travel abroad avoid inadmissibility problems
upon return by plea bargaining to immigration-safe convictions).
114 See, e.g., Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1987 (2015); Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184,
190 (2013); Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 577 n.11 (2010); Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S.
47, 59–60 (2006).
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provision. 115 The categorical approach cases, the Court has explicitly
acknowledged, allow noncitizens “to enter ‘safe harbor guilty pleas’” that
preserve narrow possibilities for equitable relief in immigration court or
sometimes avoid immigration sanctions altogether. 116 This line of
jurisprudence works hand-in-glove with Padilla, reinforcing the ability of
subfederal actors to consider downstream consequences and constrain the
application of a harsh and rigid immigration code.
Considered together, the Court’s immigration enforcement
jurisprudence over the last fifteen years “recognizes, and attempts to
structure, the critical role that enforcement discretion plays in the modern
deportation system.” 117 The Court’s recent rulings in this area—the vast
majority of which aim to protect the liberty interests of noncitizens within
the United States—evince concern with the severity and inflexibility of the
immigration code, particularly with respect to minor offenses leading to
deportation. 118 This jurisprudence reflects the notion that resident
noncitizens’ claims to membership in the United States community can be
broader than allowed by current code law, and accordingly, affiliation
circumstances such as family ties and community contributions are
appropriately considered by both federal and state actors in order to avoid
unjust removals. 119 Of particular importance to sanctuary activities, these
rulings also envision an increasing role for subfederal actors in maintaining
the fairness and legitimacy of the overall removal system, even with respect
to noncitizens deportable for civil or criminal violations.
II. THE RISE AND RETREAT OF EQUITABLE ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS
Part I made the case that a mass, indiscriminate approach to
enforcement is out of step with the context and history of the deportation
system, which the Supreme Court has endeavored to structure in ways that
continue to promote equitable considerations. This Part outlines the ways
115 Cade, Judging Immigration Equity, supra note 31, at 1060–69; Alina Das, The Immigration
Penalties of Criminal Convictions: Resurrecting Categorical Analysis in Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1669, 1700–01 (2011); Jennifer Lee Koh, The Whole Better Than the Sum: A Case for the
Categorical Approach to Determining the Immigration Consequences of Crime, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
257, 261–62 (2012); Rebecca Sharpless, Toward a True Elements Test: Taylor and the Categorical
Analysis of Crimes in Immigration Law, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 979, 996 (2008).
116 Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1987 (quoting Koh, supra note 115, at 307).
117 Cade, Judging Immigration Equity, supra note 31, at 1093.
118 Id. at 1093–1100.
119 See MOTOMURA, supra note 67, at 110–11 (outlining a theory of immigrant inclusion called
“immigration as affiliation”); Cade, supra note 31, at 1095–1100 (explaining how the Court’s
understanding of immigration law incorporates the view that removal decisions should account for
affiliation circumstances, despite the fact that current statutory law provides insufficient mechanisms for
adjudicative consideration of such factors).

456

113:433 (2018)

Sanctuaries as Equitable Delegation

that the Administrations of George W. Bush and, particularly, Barack Obama
undertook the responsibility to implement enforcement-based equity in the
removal system. While various features of those efforts were susceptible to
criticism, the key point is that for over sixteen years they reified the
necessity—and legality—of using discretion to inject a measure of justice
and proportionality into deportation decisions. This recent historical context
helps lay bare the aberrational significance of the blind crackdown currently
being implemented by the Trump Administration, which I turn to in Section
II.C.
A. The Bush Administration’s Solid Beginnings
Although immigration agencies have utilized discretionary policies in
some form since at least the late 1970s, it was not until the turn of the century
that they began to more systematically implement equitable enforcement
guidelines. 120 The aforementioned congressional letter to INS in 1999, which
urged more refined judgment in enforcement decisions, appears to have been
the catalyst for action. 121 In 2000, INS Commissioner Doris Meissner
distributed an agency memo that became a lasting blueprint for the use of
prosecutorial discretion in immigration enforcement. 122 The Meissner Memo
instructed agency managers to “plan and design operations to maximize the
likelihood that serious offenders will be identified,” 123 emphasized an
expectation of fair and consistent discretionary judgments at every stage of
the enforcement process, 124 and detailed a nonexhaustive list of humanitarian
factors that immigration officers should consider when evaluating whether
to exercise favorable discretion. 125
The development of prosecutorial discretion standards continued after
the INS was dissolved in 2003 to create the Department of Homeland
Security and its subagencies. Agency memos issued that year instructed
officers to adhere to the Meissner Memo and, in particular, to consider
forgoing removal actions against certain noncitizens who have a path to
120 See generally SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES 14–32 (2015) (chronicling the history of
immigration prosecutorial discretion from 1975 to 2007).
121 Letter to Reno, supra note 75 (noting “widespread agreement” that rigid adherence to the 1996
immigration laws had “resulted in unjustifiable hardship” in sympathetic cases).
122 See WADHIA, supra note 120, at 24 (describing the Meissner memo as “the gold standard”).
123 Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Comm’r, INS, to Reg’l Dirs. et al., INS, Exercising
Prosecutorial Discretion 4–5 (Nov. 17, 2000), http://niwaplibrary.wcl.american.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2015/IMM-Memo-ProsDiscretion.pdf [https://perma.cc/G336-F63W].
124 Id. at 1.
125 Id. at 7–8 (listing immigration history, length of residence, criminal history, humanitarian
concerns, military service, eligibility for a path to status, effect on future inadmissibility, community
attention, available enforcement resources, and other discretionary factors).
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lawful status. 126 In 2005, the Office of the Principal Legal Advisor for ICE
issued guidance to the chief counsel for each ICE regional office, further
refining scenarios for the “favorable” use of discretion, and emphasizing that
“[p]rosecutorial discretion is a very significant tool . . . to deal with the
difficult, complex and contradictory provisions of the immigration laws and
cases involving human suffering and hardship.” 127 Moderate expansion of
immigration prosecutorial discretion guidance continued throughout the
remaining years of the George W. Bush Administration. 128
B. The Obama Administration’s Expansion and Refinement
President Obama’s Administration even more explicitly acknowledged
the necessity of enforcement-based equity in a system marked by extreme
statutory rigidity. 129 Indeed, when it became clear a few years into President
Obama’s first term that Congress would be unable to enact immigration
reform, 130 DHS undertook significant efforts to systematize the use of
prosecutorial discretion. In 2011, ICE began to roll out a series of agency
126 Memorandum from Johnny N. Williams, Exec. Assoc. Comm’r of the Office of Field Operations,
INS, to Reg’l Dirs. et al., INS, Unlawful Presence (June 12, 2002), http://www.asistahelp.org/documents/
resources/CIS_DA_is_not_UP_8A0BF46109B93.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VB32-VZJK]
(requiring
attention to humanitarian factors when determining whether to undertake enforcement against unlawfully
present noncitizens who are also eligible for immigration benefits); Memorandum from William R. Yates,
Assoc. Dir. for Operations, U.S. Citizen & Immigration Servs., to Reg’l Dirs. & Serv. Ctr. Dirs., U.S.
Citizen & Immigration Servs., Service Center Issuance of Notice to Appear (Form I-862) (Sept. 12, 2013)
(on file with Northwestern University Law Review) (requiring continued adherence to the Meissner
Memo).
127 Memorandum from William J. Howard, Principal Legal Advisor, ICE, to All Chief Counsel,
Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, ICE, Prosecutorial Discretion 2–6, 8 (Oct. 24, 2005),
https://www.aila.org/File/DownloadEmbeddedFile/47955 [https://perma.cc/FL4P-2PLG].
128 See Memorandum from Julie L. Myers, Assistant Sec’y, ICE, to All Field Office Dirs. & Special
Agents in Charge, ICE, Prosecutorial and Custody Discretion (Nov. 7, 2007),
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/custody-pd.pdf [https://perma.cc/DH32-PSAV]
(reaffirming the Meissner Memo and instructing agents to release nursing mothers from detention on
discretionary grounds except in circumstances implicating public safety); Memorandum from John P.
Torres, Dir., ICE, to Assistant Dirs. et al., ICE, Discretion in Cases of Extreme or Severe Medical Concern
(Dec.
11,
2006),
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/dro_policy_memos/
discretionincasesofextremeorseveremedicalconcerndec112006.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F66N-EVK6]
(instructing ICE officers to consider favorable discretion when deciding whether to detain noncitizens
with serious medical conditions).
129 See Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 31, at 683–86 (describing the Obama
Administration’s acknowledgment, in litigation and public statements, of its responsibility to ensure that
deportation operates in a fair and proportionate manner).
130 See, e.g., David Jackson, Obama Talks Immigration With Officials -- But No Members of
Congress, USA TODAY (Apr. 19, 2011, 4:44 PM), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/
post/2011/04/obama-talks-immigration-with-officials----but-no-members-of-congress/1#.
WzTN8hJKjVo [https://perma.cc/UFG2-5REN]; Julie Mason, Obama Pushes Immigration Overhaul,
POLITICO (published May 10, 2011, 4:53 PM; updated May 10, 2011, 6:57 PM), https://www.politico.
com/story/2011/05/obama-pushes-immigration-overhaul-054696 [https://perma.cc/K75G-RA7C].
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initiatives geared toward more consistent use of equitable discretion. 131
These efforts included trainings, numerous guidance documents, and public
dissemination of transparent enforcement priorities. 132 During President
Obama’s two terms, the focus remained on encouraging front-line operatives
to consistently use the agency’s limited resources to target noncitizens with
a criminal history or significant immigration violations and to forbear
enforcement in cases with compelling humanitarian factors. 133
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), announced in 2012,
represented the agency’s attempt to shift toward systematic and categorical
implementation of enforcement discretion. 134 DACA focused on one of the
most sympathetic groups of undocumented noncitizens—longtime residents
131

See, e.g., Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., ICE, to All Emps., ICE, Civil Immigration
Enforcement: Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (Mar. 2, 2011),
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2011/110302washingtondc.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J7QA7KHF]; Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., ICE, to All Field Office Dirs. et al., ICE, Exercising
Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for
the Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Aliens 4–5 (June 17, 2011),
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3FVQ-MPKE] [hereinafter Memorandum from John Morton, Exercising Prosecutorial
Discretion].
132 See, e.g., Guidance to ICE Attorneys Reviewing the CBP, USCIS, and ICE Cases Before the
Executive Office for Immigration Review, ICE, http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/guidanceto-ice-attorneys-reviewing-cbp-uscis-ice-cases-before-eoir.pdf [https://perma.cc/V3U2-NAHW]; Next Steps in
the Implementation of the Prosecutorial Discretion Memorandum and the August 18th Announcement on
Immigration
Enforcement
Priorities,
ICE,
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/
ero/pdf/pros-discretion-next-steps.pdf [https://perma.cc/QG6L-Y9QT]; Memorandum from Jeh Charles
Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., ICE, et al., Secure
Communities (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_
secure_communities.pdf [https://perma.cc/UQ5F-NQHV]; Memorandum from Gary Mead, Exec. Assoc.
Dir., ICE, et al., to All Field Office Dirs. et al., ICE, Applicability of Prosecutorial Discretion Memoranda
to Certain Family Relationships (Oct. 5, 2012), http://www.immigrationequality.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/11/PD-memo-10-5-2012-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3NY-NGZZ]; Memorandum
from John Morton, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 131; Memorandum from John
Morton, Dir., ICE, to All Field Office Dirs. et al., ICE, Prosecutorial Discretion: Certain Victims,
Witnesses,
and
Plaintiffs
(June
17,
2011),
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/
prosecutorial-discretion/certain-victims-witnesses-plaintiffs.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5EHP-MMJS];
Memorandum from Peter S. Vincent, Principal Legal Advisor, ICE, to All Chief Counsel, Office of the
Principal Legal Advisor, ICE, Case-by-Case Review of Incoming and Certain Pending Cases (Nov. 17,
2011), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/case-by-case-review-incoming-certainpending-cases-memorandum.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZP6E-T8GD]; Policy Memorandum, U.S. Citizenship
& Immigration Servs., Revised Guidance for the Referral of Cases and Issuance of Notices to Appear
(NTAs) in Cases Involving Inadmissible and Removable Aliens (Nov. 7, 2011),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/Static_Files_Memoranda/
NTA%20PM%20%28Approved%20as%20final%2011-7-11%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TTC-7T5D].
133 See generally WADHIA, supra note 120, at 88–104 (describing the Obama Administration’s
prosecutorial discretion policies with respect to immigration enforcement).
134 See Julia Preston & John H. Cushman Jr., Obama to Permit Young Migrants to Remain in U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2012), https://nyti.ms/OQZY77 [https://perma.cc/N3V3-ZT7D].
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who were brought to the United States at a young age, demonstrated a strong
potential for economic productivity, and lacked indicia of dangerousness or
wrongdoing. 135 Such individuals had been deeply acculturated as Americans
and were largely considered to bear little or no personal culpability in their
past violations of immigration laws.136 The DACA program allowed those
who met the specified criteria to affirmatively present themselves to a unit
within USCIS for “targeted consideration of their eligibility for equitable
balancing,” with favorable action resulting in deferred action and, possibly,
employment authorization. 137 For many observers, the lack of any path to
lawful status for these hard-working, law-abiding youth, who know only this
country, brought the current system’s unforgiving harshness into sharp
relief. 138 Although controversial for its programmatic nature, 139 DACA
brought a large dose of transparency and consistency to the implementation
135 See Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGR. SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-childhood-arrivalsdaca [https://perma.cc/R8VR-8RV7] [hereinafter Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals];
Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to David V. Aguilar, Acting
Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to
Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children (June 15, 2012),
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-usas-children.pdf [http://perma.cc/9QDW-3GTC].
136 See Ronald Brownstein, Poll: Public Prefers Citizenship for Dreamers, ATLANTIC (May 9, 2012),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/05/poll-public-prefers-citizenship-fordreamers/427329 [https://perma.cc/VY3Y-RZC5]; Jennifer De Pinto et al., Most Americans Support
DACA, but Oppose Border Wall - CBS News Poll, CBS NEWS (published Jan. 18, 2018, 7:00 AM; updated
Jan. 20, 2018, 12:37 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/most-americans-support-daca-but-opposeborder-wall-cbs-news-poll [https://perma.cc/8ZZK-EZV5].
137 Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 31, at 694–95. Deferred action is “a revocable
assurance that they are not going to be a priority for deportation.” Id. at 694.
138 See generally id. at 696–97 (arguing and citing sources for the point that DACA recipients’
“personal mitigating factors point toward lack of (or significantly diminished) culpability, full
acculturation as Americans, strong community ties, [and] high potential for economic productivity,” and
that therefore “concerns about equity loom especially large”); MOTOMURA, supra note 67, at 176 (same);
Anil Kalhan, Deferred Action, Supervised Enforcement Discretion, and the Rule of Law Basis for
Executive Action on Immigration, 63 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 58, 92 (2015) (arguing that “individuals
eligible for DACA, as individuals who ‘were brought to this country as children’ without any ‘intent to
violate the law,’ arguably might be more likely to have stronger positive equities simply by definition”).
139 See, e.g., Peter Margulies, Taking Care of Immigration Law: Presidential Stewardship,
Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Separation of Powers, 94 B.U. L. REV. 105, 119 (2014) (“While
prosecutorial discretion is a touchstone of immigration law, it cannot bear DACA’s weight. Prosecutorial
discretion to grant deferred removal has typically functioned as a palliative measure after a noncitizen
has been apprehended and placed in immigration proceedings. DACA, in contrast, establishes an
affirmative immigration benefit that noncitizens can apply for just as they can seek asylum or other relief.”
(footnote omitted)); Price, supra note 62, at 761 (“Yet declining to prioritize certain cases, as the
executive branch might properly have done, may have very different effects from an announced,
categorical policy like DACA. While the former preserves the deterrent effect of federal statutes by
leaving all individuals covered by the statute in some jeopardy, the latter removes the risk of enforcement
altogether.”).
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of immigration enforcement discretion, at least with respect to one category
of highly sympathetic noncitizens. 140
During this time, DHS also prioritized enforcement against two
particular groups of noncitizens: recent border crossers and those who
encounter criminal justice systems. Although not all deportations of persons
within these categories satisfy proportionality concerns, prioritizing limited
resources in this way lessened the likelihood of enforcement against
nontargeted groups, for whom significant equitable claims are often present.
Specifically, noncitizens who have already been living in the United States
for some time, and who have avoided a criminal record, are more likely to
have developed ties and relationships militating against removal. 141 As a
result of this strategy, border removals under the Obama Administration
dramatically increased as a percentage of overall removals—constituting
about 66% between 2012 and 2015. 142 Similarly, nearly half of deportees in
that era had at least some kind of criminal history. 143
While these measures represented substantial efforts to implement
equitable discretion, many scholars, advocates, and courts viewed DHS’s
enforcement approach during this time to be overly coarse, particularly with
respect to noncitizens with a criminal history. President Obama, like the
administrations that preceded him, largely ignored equitable considerations
for persons with convictions and instead “used criminal history of almost any
140

MOTOMURA, supra note 67, at 176; Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 31, at 694–
98; Kalhan, supra note 138, at 66; Hiroshi Motomura, The President’s Dilemma: Executive Authority,
Enforcement, and the Rule of Law in Immigration Law, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 22 (2015–2016); see also
Letter from 136 Law Professors and Scholars to the President, Executive Authority to Protect Individuals
or Groups from Deportation (Sept. 3, 2014), https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/_file/Law-Professor-Letter.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R5QX-KDG8] (outlining the Executive’s authority to use discretion to protect
individuals or groups from deportation).
141 See, e.g., HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION
AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 96–114 (2006) (outlining the history in immigration law of
“affiliation-based safe harbors” that accrue through extended presence inside the United States and the
development of due process norms aimed at protecting noncitizens who have developed ties from
executive overreach); MOTOMURA, supra note 67, at 111 (“[A]ffiliation arguments grow in strength as
unauthorized migrants develop ties and make contributions to American society over time.”); Juliet P.
Stumpf, Doing Time: Crimmigration Law and the Perils of Haste, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1705 (2011)
(explaining how noncitizens develop equities over time).
142 See FY 2015 ICE Immigration Removals, ICE, https://www.ice.gov/removal-statistics/2015
[https://perma.cc/N34T-M4M3] (showing that border deportations constituted at least two thirds of all
removal orders from 2012 to 2015).
143 Id. (showing that over half of deported persons in each year from 2010 to 2015 had some kind of
criminal conviction). By way of comparison, according to government statistics, DHS removed a total of
2,011,630 immigrants under the George W. Bush Administration, of which only 710,242, or 35%, had
some kind of criminal history. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2008 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS
96–104
(2009),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
Yearbook_Immigration_Statistics_2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/APZ2-MR7G] (presenting data on
removals from years 2001–2008).
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type as an irrevocable marker of undesirability.” 144 Indeed, the majority of
those whom the Obama-era DHS labeled “criminal aliens” had been
convicted only of traffic offenses, low-level drug possession, crimes of
migration (illegal entry or re-entry), or other minor offenses. 145 ICE officers
and attorneys denied leniency in most cases involving noncitizens with any
criminal history and consistently sought the broadest and most severe
interpretations of criminal removal statutes possible, even in the face of
repeated reversals by the Supreme Court.146 Additionally, under President
Obama, the immigration agencies vastly increased the use of fast-track
removal mechanisms such as expedited removal, 147 reinstatement of
removal, 148 and administrative removal, 149 all of which bypass immigration
court adjudication. In fact, these measures accounted for more than 83% of
total removals in 2013 and 2014. 150 As Professor Jennifer Koh has argued,
the fact that these kinds of procedures lack even the limited procedural
144 Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 31, at 700; see also Cade, supra note 32, at 42–
44; Eagly, supra note 113, at 1126, 1145–46.
145 MARC R. ROSENBLUM & KRISTEN MCCABE, MIGRATION POLICY INST., DEPORTATION AND
DISCRETION: REVIEWING THE RECORD AND OPTIONS FOR CHANGE 19–20, tbl.B-3, app. C (2014),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/deportation-and-discretion-reviewing-record-and-optionschange [https://perma.cc/3ANP-HQAA] (indicating that 61% of interior removals in FY 2013 consisted
of persons with no criminal record whatsoever or whose most serious offense was immigration offenses,
traffic offenses, simple drug possession, or other nonviolent, nonserious crimes); MARC R. ROSENBLUM
& DORIS MEISSNER, MIGRATION POLICY INST., THE DEPORTATION DILEMMA: RECONCILING TOUGH
AND HUMANE ENFORCEMENT 6 (2014), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/deportation-dilemmareconciling-tough-humane-enforcement [https://perma.cc/22RU-8HAT] (“At the same time, most of the
recent shift from noncriminal to criminal removals has been driven by increased removals of people
convicted exclusively of immigration-related crimes.”); Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note
31, at 705 (“More than a quarter of all noncitizens deported after local criminal arrest have never been
convicted of any crime at all.”); Angélica Cházaro, Challenging the “Criminal Alien” Paradigm,
63 UCLA L. REV. 594, 645 (2016) (“The creation and consolidation of the significant misdemeanor
category creates wider nets by expanding the pool of people who are properly labeled criminal aliens.”);
Eagly, supra note 113, at 1140–46 (explaining that “the criminal alien category includes all noncitizens
convicted of crimes—from misdemeanors to serious felonies” and graphically illustrating recent
immigration enforcement in practice).
146 See, e.g., Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 206 (2013) (“This is the third time in seven years
that we have considered whether the Government has properly characterized a low-level drug offense as
‘illicit trafficking in a controlled substance,’ and thus an ‘aggravated felony.’ Once again we hold that the
Government’s approach defies ‘the commonsense conception’ of these terms.” (quoting CarachuriRosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 573 (2010))). See generally Cade, Judging Immigration Equity, supra
note 31, at 1060–69 (discussing the Court’s recent categorical approach cases in the immigration context).
147 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (2012) (allowing immigration officials at the border to issue removal
orders).
148 Id. § 1231(a)(5) (allowing immigration officials to re-execute a prior removal order where the
noncitizen unlawfully reenters the United States).
149 Id. § 1228(b)(2)(B) (allowing immigration officials to process noncitizens who lack lawful
permanent resident status in fast-track proceedings with weaker procedural and substantive protections
and no oversight by a neutral immigration judge).
150 Koh, supra note 25, at 184 (citing statistics from the Department of Homeland Security).
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protections available in immigration court casts doubt on their ability to
reach accurate and consistent outcomes. 151
In sum, immigration enforcement during the Obama Administration
was a mixed bag. At the same time that this period saw significant expansion
and refinement of discretionary measures intended to bring more fairness
and proportionality into the removal system, the agency’s approach toward
noncitizens with criminal histories lacked sufficient nuance and the
Administration effectuated more formal deportations than any previous
administration.
C. The Trump Administration’s Retreat
It is some indication of the highly sympathetic circumstances of
DACA-eligible youth that President Trump waited seven months to
announce the end of the discretionary program. 152 But even these 800,000
exceptional young people—now working jobs, paying taxes, serving in the
military, and studying in colleges and universities across the country—could
not inspire the current Administration to take a humanitarian approach with
respect to their continued presence in the United States. 153 As of this writing,
two federal district courts have found error in the manner in which DHS
ended the DACA program, leading to its temporary reinstatement. 154

151

Id. at 222–31.
See Michael D. Shear & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Moves to End DACA and Calls on
Congress to Act, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/05/us/politics/trumpdaca-dreamers-immigration.html [https://perma.cc/V4SV-FL6Q].
153 See, e.g., Ike Brannon & Logan Albright, The Economic and Fiscal Impact of Repealing DACA,
CATO AT LIBERTY (Jan. 18, 2017, 3:00 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/economic-fiscal-impactrepealing-daca [https://perma.cc/2QCF-MVRV] (reporting that the fiscal cost of deporting every DACA
recipient would be “a $280 billion reduction in economic growth over the next decade”); Tom K. Wong
et al., DACA Recipients’ Economic and Educational Gains Continue to Grow, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS
(Aug.
28,
2017,
9:01
AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/
2017/08/28/437956/daca-recipients-economic-educational-gains-continue-grow [https://perma.cc/594AJWCE] (“The survey’s results also show that at least 72 percent of the top 25 Fortune 500 companies
employ DACA recipients. Moreover, 97 percent of respondents are currently employed or enrolled in
school.”).
154 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1037,
1046 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (“Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on their claim that the rescission
was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”), aff’d,
2018 WL 5833232 (9th Cir. Nov. 8, 2018); Alan Feuer, Second Federal Judge Issues Injunction to Keep
DACA in Place, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/13/nyregion/dacadreamers-injunction-trump.html [https://perma.cc/V3LS-MHS4] (“In his ruling, Judge Garaufis agreed
with the lawyers that the rollback was arbitrary and capricious . . . .”). Appeals of these and related
decisions are pending, but as of this writing the district courts’ orders to process DACA renewals remain
in effect. For updates on pending DACA litigation, see Status of Current DACA Litigation, NAT’L
IMMIGRATION LAW CTR. (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.nilc.org/issues/daca/status-current-daca-litigation
[https://perma.cc/9KM5-WC9M].
152
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Ultimately, however, the fate of these young people will rest in the hands of
the political branches.
The new Administration rapidly began changing the federal
government’s enforcement approach in other respects. Then-DHS Secretary
Kelly issued memoranda at the outset of his appointment that wholly
abandoned the Obama-era prosecutorial discretion guidelines as agencywide policy. 155 The Administration immediately began to ramp up
enforcement measures and rhetoric against all deportable noncitizens,
regardless of their equities or any mitigating circumstances. 156 In a February
2017 memo, for example, ICE Associate Director Matthew Albence
instructed his 5700 deportation officers to “take enforcement action against
all removable aliens encountered in the course of their duties.”157 Likewise,
ICE trial attorneys have been told not to exercise discretion in removal
proceedings even for persons with time-delayed paths to lawful status, such
as those with pending U status applications or beneficiaries of family-based
petitions awaiting U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
adjudication of provisional hardship waivers. 158 Further, DHS has broadened
its conception of “criminal aliens” for purposes of establishing removal
priorities, sweeping in noncitizens merely arrested but not yet convicted of
any crime. 159
This hard tack was no mere rhetoric. From February to December of
2017, ICE made 143,000 arrests for civil immigration violations, a 42%
155

Kelly, Priorities Memo, supra note 8.
See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text.
157 Memorandum from Matthew T. Albence, Exec. Assoc. Dir., ICE, to All ERO Employees, ICE,
Implementing the President’s Border Security and Interior Immigration Enforcement
Policies
(Feb.
21,
2017),
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3889695doc00801320170630123624.html [https://perma.cc/8588-UVXA]; see also Raymond, supra note 15
(quoting ICE Acting Director Thomas Homan as making clear the agency’s position that “[t]here’s no
population off the table. If you’re in this country illegally, we’re looking for you and we’re going to look
to apprehend you”).
158 See Minutes for AILA/ICE Liaison Meeting on October 26, 2017, AILA Doc. No. 18011132, at
2–4 (Jan. 11, 2018) (containing an official statement from the agency that ICE Trial Attorneys “should
not administratively close cases where applications are pending with other agencies,” including Special
Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) filings, U visas, and unaccompanied child asylum applications) (on file with
Northwestern University Law Review). Hardship waivers can help relatives of U.S. citizens or LPRs
overcome a ten-year bar on lawful admission due to prior unauthorized presence in the United States. Id.
at 11.
159 See Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed.
Reg. 8,799, 8,800 (Jan. 30, 2017); Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Security, to Kevin McAleenan, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al., Implementing the
President’s Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Policies (Feb. 20, 2017),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Implementing-the-Presidents-BorderSecurity-Immigration-Enforcement-Improvement-Policies.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FS5Q-7ESL]
[hereinafter Kelly, Implementation Memo].
156

464

113:433 (2018)

Sanctuaries as Equitable Delegation

increase from 2016. 160 During that period ICE increased its detention of
noncitizens without any criminal history by 250%. 161 ICE agents have
conducted extensive home raids around the country, 162 entered courthouses
and hospitals to apprehend victims and witnesses believed to be
deportable, 163 and targeted caregivers of U.S. citizens. 164 The agency has also
160

Raymond, supra note 15.
Id.; see also Marcelo Rochabrun, ICE Officers Told to Take Action Against All Undocumented
Immigrants Encountered While on Duty, PROPUBLICA (July 7, 2017, 8:00 AM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/ice-officers-told-to-take-action-against-all-undocumentedimmigrants-encountered-while-on-duty [https://perma.cc/PM7Z-XLF7] (“Between February and May,
the Trump Administration arrested, on average, 108 undocumented immigrants a day with no criminal
record, an uptick of some 150 percent from the same time period a year ago.” (citation omitted)); Maria
Sacchetti & Ed O’Keefe, ICE Data Shows Half of Immigrants Arrested in Raids had Traffic Convictions
or No Record, WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/social-issues/icedata-shows-half-of-immigrants-arrested-in-raids-had-traffic-convictions-or-no-record/2017/
04/28/81ff7284-2c59-11e7-b605-33413c691853_story.html [https://perma.cc/PM7Z-XLF7] (“About
half of the 675 immigrants picked up in roundups across the United States in the days after President
Trump took office either had no criminal convictions or had committed traffic offenses, mostly drunken
driving, as their most serious crimes.”).
162 Lisa Rein et al., Federal Agents Conduct Immigration Enforcement Raids in at Least Six States,
WASH. POST (Feb. 11, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/federal-agents-conductsweeping-immigration-enforcement-raids-in-at-least-6-states/2017/02/10/4b9f443a-efc8-11e6-b4ffac2cf509efe5_story.html [https://perma.cc/8RX8-BVHQ] (reporting on ICE raids in Los Angeles,
Chicago, Atlanta, North Carolina, South Carolina, and New York).
163 See, e.g., Barbara Demick, Federal Agents in Texas Move Hospitalized Salvadoran Woman
Awaiting Emergency Surgery to a Detention Facility, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2017),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-hospital-seizure-20170223-story.html
[https://perma.cc/8RX8BVHQ]; Azi Paybarah, Law Enforcement, Court Officials Differ on Impact of ICE Courthouse Arrests,
(Aug.
3,
2017,
5:39
PM),
https://www.politico.com/states/newPOLITICO
york/albany/story/2017/08/03/law-enforcement-court-officials-differ-on-impact-of-ice-courthousearrests-113781 [https://perma.cc/79M2-L2DF] (“Federal immigration officials are hampering the
business of courts by targeting witnesses and victims of crimes for deportation, the New York State
Attorney General and acting Brooklyn District Attorney said Thursday.”); Letter From Tani G. CantilSakauye, Chief Justice, Cal. Supreme Court, to Attorney Gen. Jeff Sessions & John Kelly, Sec’y, U.S.
Dept. of Homeland Sec. (Mar. 16, 2017), https://newsroom.courts.ca.gov/news/chief-justice-cantilsakauye-objects-to-immigration-enforcement-tactics-at-california-courthouses [https://perma.cc/9N6VR6U7] (“Courthouses should not be used as bait in the necessary enforcement of our country’s
immigration laws.”); see also ICE, DIRECTIVE NO. 11072.1, CIVIL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
ACTIONS
INSIDE
COURTHOUSES
(2018),
https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
Document/2018/ciEnforcementActionsCourthouses.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XND-VVAK] (defending
and providing guidance for continued immigration enforcement efforts at courthouses).
164 Caitlin Dickerson, Trump Administration Targets Parents in New Immigration Crackdown, N.Y.
TIMES (July 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/01/us/trump-arrest-undocumentedimmigrants.html [https://perma.cc/X9U2-GQEZ]; Katie Honan, 2 Queens Teens Beg ICE Not to
Deport Father Who Sought Political Asylum, DNA INFO (Oct. 10, 2017, 4:44 PM),
https://www.dnainfo.com/new-york/20171010/jackson-heights/bablu-sharif-ice-queens-detentiondeportation-president-trump [https://perma.cc/QNA4-RGXV]; Michael Sangiacomo, Caregiver to
Severely Handicapped Stepson to be Deported Again (Photos), PLAIN DEALER (published Sept. 25, 2017;
updated Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2017/09/caregiver_to_
severely_handicap.html [https://perma.cc/S43X-N76Q] (describing the Trump Administration’s decision
161
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significantly ramped up its use of immigration detainer requests for
arrestees 165 as well as the detention of individuals with prior stays of removal
who have stayed out of trouble, supported their families, and faithfully
shown up to annual immigration check-ins for years. 166 Even noncitizens
seeking to take advantage of clear paths to lawful status may not be spared
from adverse discretion and detention. 167 There are indications that DHS is
positioning itself to dramatically increase the use of both discretionary
detention 168 and rapid removal mechanisms. 169
To help effectuate this clampdown, the Trump Administration has
renewed federal reliance on the assistance of state and local law enforcement
agencies, including through the reanimation of programs such as 287(g)

to deport a man who has provided critical care for fourteen years to his son with cerebral palsy and mental
disabilities, despite a stay granted in 2015 by the Obama Administration).
165 Sacchetti, supra note 8 (documenting a 75% rise in number of detainer requests ICE sought for
arrested noncitizens); Use of ICE Detainers: Obama vs. Trump, TRAC IMMIGRATION, (Aug. 30, 2017),
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/479 [https://perma.cc/45AK-VSXK]. Whenever individuals are
arrested, local authorities submit their fingerprints to the FBI to check for warrants. Pursuant to an
interagency protocol, the prints are then automatically forwarded to DHS. If DHS databases indicate that
the arrestee may be present in the United States without authorization (which is merely a civil violation),
or removable for other civil or criminal violations, then DHS agents—or local officers deputized pursuant
to 287(g) agreements—issue a detainer, asking the local law enforcement agency to hold the noncitizen
for an additional forty-eight hours, facilitating federal agents’ ability to pick him or her up. Cade, supra
note 47, at 1763–65. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2012) (authorizing the Attorney General to enter
into agreements with states and their subdivisions to carry out the functions of immigration officers,
known as 287(g) agreements).
166 For an extensive roundup of media reports concerning recent enforcement actions that challenge
notions of proportionality or fairness, see Bill Ong Hing, Entering the Trump ICE Age: Contextualizing
the New Immigration Enforcement Regime, 5 TEX. A&M L. REV. 253, 299–307 (2018); see also supra
notes 2–11 and accompanying text.
167 See, e.g., Cramer, supra note 9.
168 Clark Mindock, Trump Plans Massive Private Prison Expansion to Jail Undocumented
Immigrants, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 18, 2017, 10:58 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/
americas/us-politics/trump-prison-immigrants-expansion-undocumented-private-plans-ice-a8007876.
html [https://perma.cc/D2N7-ZW8R].
169 See, e.g., Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, Exec. Order No. 13,767,
82 Fed. Reg. 8,793, 8,796 (Jan. 30, 2017) (announcing expansion of the use of expedited removal
proceedings); Kelly, Implementation Memo, supra note 159, at 6–7 (same); Memorandum from Attorney
Gen. Jefferson B. Sessions to All Federal Prosecutors, Renewed Commitment to Criminal Immigration
Enforcement (Apr. 11, 2017) (instructing federal prosecutors to ramp up prosecutions for migration
crimes and the corresponding tool of stipulated removals). See generally Jennifer M. Chacón,
Immigration and the Bully Pulpit, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 243, 263–64 (2017) (anticipating increased use
of fast-track removal procedures, such as stipulated orders of removal, under the Trump Administration);
Jennifer Lee Koh, Anticipating Expansion, Committing to Resistance: Removal in the Shadows of
Immigration Court Under Trump, 43 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 459, 459–60 (2017) (same).
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cooperative enforcement agreements, 170 Secure Communities, 171 and the
Criminal Alien Program. 172 The programs differ, but each heavily relies on
immigration detainers to allow federal authorities to take custody of
noncitizens arrested by local police. The legality of continuing to confine
persons based on detainer requests is hotly contested. 173 Nevertheless, many
jurisdictions readily comply and, in other respects, embrace a cooperative
role in federal immigration enforcement. 174
In short, the Trump Administration has taken a vigorous and
indiscriminate approach to immigration enforcement, an approach that it
believes states and cities must aid. Secretary Kelly explicitly declined any
responsibility to impose considerations of equity on the statutorily rigid
system: “If lawmakers do not like the laws they’ve passed and we are
charged to enforce, then they should have the courage and skill to change the
laws.” 175 Judge Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals summed up
the new reality of immigration enforcement like this: “President Trump has
claimed that his immigration policies would target the ‘bad hombres.’ The
government’s decision to remove [a noncitizen petitioner with unusually
compelling equities] shows that even the ‘good hombres’ are not safe.” 176
As I have argued, this mass enforcement approach is out of step with a
contextual understanding of the deportation scheme. The rigidity and
severity of the current statute require some measure of equitable enforcement
discretion to maintain accuracy and fairness. Where local jurisdictions act to
170 See Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed.
Reg. 8,799, 8,800 (Jan. 30, 2017) (announcing that federal agencies will seek to enact 287(g) cooperative
enforcement agreements with local authorities).
171 See id. at 8,801 (announcing that federal agencies will reinstate the Secure Communities
program).
172 See Kelly, Priorities Memo, supra note 8, at 3 (“ICE should devote available resources to
expanding the use of the Criminal Alien Program in any willing jurisdiction in the United States.”).
173 Courts have held that confinement solely on the basis of an immigration detainer violates the
Fourth Amendment because detainer requests do not supply sufficient probable cause that a crime has
been committed. See infra notes 194–98 and accompanying text.
174 See, e.g., Cade, supra note 47, at 1763–66; Stella Burch Elias, “Good Reason to Believe”:
Widespread Constitutional Violations in the Course of Immigration Enforcement and the Case for
Revisiting Lopez-Mendoza, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 1109; Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion that Matters:
Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and the Civil–Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L.
REV. 1819 (2011).
175 Devlin Barrett, DHS Secretary Kelly Says Congressional Critics Should ‘Shut Up’ or Change
Laws, WASH. POST (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/dhssecretary-kelly-says-congressional-critics-should-shut-up-or-change-laws/2017/04/18/8a2a92b6-245411e7-b503-9d616bd5a305_story.html [https://perma.cc/95HY-URN4].
176 Ortiz v. Sessions, 857 F.3d 966, 968 (9th Cir. 2017) (decrying ICE’s “inhumane” decision to
remove a noncitizen who became a “pillar of his community” over three decades in the United States but
finding no legal basis to halt the agency’s decision). I discuss this and other recent cases evaluating Trump
Administration removal decisions elsewhere. See Cade, supra note 85.
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strengthen the federal government’s enforcement hand as cooperative force
multipliers, these legitimacy norms are at even more risk. 177 This context
helps us grasp the role that sanctuary efforts now play in the deportation
system, which the remainder of this Article will elaborate upon.
III. THE EMERGENCE OF SANCTUARIES
A variety of subfederal governments and institutions have implemented
policies or undertaken actions that could be described as “sanctuary.”
Sanctuary actors include both public entities (police departments, civil
agencies, and public colleges), and private institutions (churches,
synagogues, mosques, and universities). 178 In broad terms, sanctuary efforts
consist of state or local policies that increase the ability of deportable
noncitizens to engage with government or community institutions without
detection or apprehension by federal immigration authorities. Sanctuary
efforts can also include the actions of public or private entities that provide
noncitizens with community aid, legal resources, or other assistance intended
to help them access statutory or discretionary relief from removal, or at least
to forestall deportation temporarily. My primary focus here is on the
defensive measures taken by sanctuaries that either limit the access or
information provided to federal immigration enforcers or that increase
noncitizens’ removal defense resources. 179 These kinds of activities most
directly inject equity-influencing dynamics into the current Administration’s
mass deportation efforts.
In this Part, I will briefly introduce each form of sanctuary and touch
on the relevant legal and policy justifications for its activities. Although the
legality disputes are not the focus of my analysis, the fact that each sanctuary
action likely stands on legally sound footing contributes to its clout. Just as
importantly, if sanctuaries are likely to weather challenges from the
Executive Branch, they are better positioned to make a more lasting impact
in the removal system. In Part IV, I will explain how sanctuaries work to
foster legal and equitable norms in immigration decision-making processes.

177 Cf. Villazor & Gulasekaram, supra note 44, at 7 (“Moreover, even in a ‘dissenting’ role, where a
private or local sanctuary is located in a decidedly anti-sanctuary state, these local and hyper-local
expressions remain critical sites of resistance and norm-creation.”).
178 Villazor, supra note 21, at 137.
179 See Ming H. Chen, Trust in Immigration Enforcement: State Noncooperation and Sanctuary
Cities After Secure Communities, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 13, 25–35 (2016) (describing a range of
motivations behind state and local resistance to federal immigration enforcement policies).

468

113:433 (2018)

Sanctuaries as Equitable Delegation

A. Sanctuary Cities
A large and growing number of municipalities have enacted various
forms of sanctuary policies. 180 Much of the activity in this area has been
concerned with federal data-sharing enforcement programs, through which
federal officials identify potentially deportable noncitizens when they are
booked into local jails and then issue detainers requesting that local
authorities continue to detain such persons when they would otherwise be
entitled to release. 181 These sanctuary measures limit the circumstances in
which local authorities will either (1) obtain and/or share information about
the immigration status of noncitizens with federal immigration agencies, (2)
detain noncitizens explicitly (and solely) for the purpose of facilitating
federal enforcers to take them into federal custody, or (3) notify federal
agents when such persons are being released from local detention.182 Many
of the policies, it should be noted, contain explicit or de facto exceptions for
persons with serious criminal histories, outstanding warrants, or other
significant red flags. 183
Some of these municipal sanctuaries date back to the 1980s, arising in
the context of the federal government’s dismal record of asylum adjudication
for Central American refugees. 184 More proliferated between the late 1990s
and 2015 as some counties and cities began to resist DHS’s increasing
prioritization of enforcement against noncitizens who encounter the criminal
justice system and the agency’s attempts to co-opt local law enforcement
180

See Villazor & Gulasekaram, supra note 44, at 42.
Christopher N. Lasch, Sanctuary Cities and Dog-Whistle Politics, 42 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 159, 161 (2016) (“The anti-detainer movement arose out of state and local resistance to
the federal ‘Secure Communities’ program, which linked federal crime databases with federal
immigration databases, allowing federal immigration officials to identify suspected immigration violators
soon after their booking into a local jail. Secure Communities resulted in a ten-fold increase in the number
of detainers placed, and advocates soon realized the battle against Secure Communities could be
successfully waged by fighting the use of detainers.” (footnote omitted)); see supra note 170 and
accompanying text.
182 See Christopher N. Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities,” 59 B.C. L. REV. 1703, 1736–
48 (2018) (discussing various sanctuary city policies).
183 Id.; see also, e.g., S.B. 54, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017) (providing a range of exceptions
based on criminal history to the state’s general prohibition on cooperation with immigration enforcement
authorities); Julianne Hing, Despite ‘Sanctuary City’ Status, Chicago Police Feed Trump’s Deportation
Machine, NATION (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/despite-sanctuary-city-statuschicago-police-feed-trumps-deportation-machine [https://perma.cc/M6YC-XSJ7] (“Currently, the city
permits its police officers to cooperate with federal immigration authorities’ requests to detain a person
on their behalf if someone falls into one of four categories: if a person is in the city’s gang database, has
an outstanding criminal warrant, is convicted of a felony, or has an open felony case.”).
184 Bill Ong Hing, Immigration Sanctuary Policies: Constitutional and Representative of Good
Policing and Good Public Policy, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 247, 252–59 (2012) (describing informationlimiting policies adopted in San Francisco and New York City in the 1980s); Lasch, supra note 181, at
159–62 (briefly describing the history of the “Sanctuary City” from the 1980s to 2015).
181

469

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

into the identification and detention of potentially deportable noncitizens. 185
As of December 2016, about 300 jurisdictions had adopted policies that in
some way restrict the extent to which these cities and municipalities comply
with immigration detainers or share information with immigration
authorities. 186 Similar state and local measures have continued to rapidly
proliferate in the first year of the Trump Administration. 187 Professor Chris
Lasch and others have established an online library that tracks such
policies. 188
Policymakers have raised a number of justifications for law
enforcement sanctuary measures, which tend to focus on resource
constraints, legal liability, and unintended secondary consequences for
policing. In some jurisdictions, the articulated rationales also include fairness
concerns. 189 Chiefly, policymakers emphasize that such endeavors are
critical to community policing and public safety. 190 Assurances that police
185

Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and National
Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1843 (2007); Stella Burch Elias, Immigrant Covering, 58 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 765, 839 (2017) (“In 2008, approximately seventy local jurisdictions had prevented their law
enforcement officials from inquiring into an individual’s immigration status or discriminating against
persons on the basis of that status.”); Lasch, supra note 181, at 159–61; Cristina M. Rodríguez, The
Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 601 (2008).
186 Barbara E. Armacost, “Sanctuary” Laws: The New Immigration Federalism, 2016 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 1197, 1220 (citing reports about sanctuary jurisdictions).
187 Elias, supra note 185, at 816; Understanding “Sanctuary Cities”—Online Appendix: Policies
Sorted by State, WESTMINSTER L. LIBR. (last updated Jun. 6, 2018, 11:55 AM),
http://libguides.law.du.edu/c.php?g=705342&p=5008843 [https://perma.cc/329T-79T7]; see, e.g.,
DENVER, COLO., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 25-250 (2018); Atlanta, Ga., Res. 17-R-4256 (Sept. 5, 2017),
http://atlantacityga.iqm2.com/Citizens/Detail_LegiFile.aspx?Frame=SplitView&MeetingID=2040&Me
diaPosition=&ID=13260&CssClass= [https://perma.cc/3RYC-DNFK].
188 Understanding “Sanctuary Cities”—Online Appendix: Policies Sorted by State, supra note 187.
189 Armacost, supra note 186, at 1199 (arguing that sanctuary policies are often designed “to address
certain pathologies of a system in which local policing and immigration enforcement has become
destructively intertwined”); Kristina M. Campbell, Humanitarian Aid Is Never a Crime? The Politics of
Immigration Enforcement and the Provision of Sanctuary, 63 SYRACUSE L. REV. 71, 111–13 (2012)
(arguing that most sanctuary city policies have little to do with providing protection to deportable
immigrants but instead are focused on general public safety); Chen, supra note 179, at 53–54 (describing
a range of motivations for sanctuary policies and resistance to federal immigration enforcement); Lasch
et al., supra note 182, at 1752–73 (discussing a range of legal and policy rationales behind sanctuary city
measures).
190 DORIS MARIE PROVINE ET AL., POLICING IMMIGRANTS: LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ON THE
FRONT LINES 4 (2016) (“Helping to maintain a variety of approaches, however, is the tension between
enforcement of immigration laws against law-abiding, but undocumented, residents and the principle of
community policing based on trusting relationships with all residents in a community.”); Armacost, supra
note 186, at 1250 (“Many state and local police departments complain that associating ordinary policing
so closely with immigration enforcement—especially when it involves racial profiling and targets minor
offenders—undermines trust between the police and immigrant communities.”); Elias, supra note 185, at
815 (explaining that sanctuary protocols are primarily motivated by public safety and economic
concerns); Hing, supra note 184, at 297–308 (same); see, e.g., Senate Leader de León’s California Values
Act Clears Legislature, SENATOR KEVIN DE LEÓN (Sept. 16, 2017), http://sd24.senate.ca.gov/news/2017-
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and other authorities will not provide immigration-related information to
federal enforcers encourage victims and witnesses to come forward and
report crimes, furthering safety goals for the entire community. 191 Indeed,
studies have suggested that sanctuary jurisdictions are safer than places
without sanctuary measures, as measured by crime rates. 192 Additionally,
policing distortions, such as racial profiling, can creep in when law
enforcement officers know that immigration enforcement is likely to follow
an arrest regardless of whether a criminal prosecution will occur.193
A second defense of law enforcement sanctuary measures rests on
constitutional constraints and legal liability for violations.194 Many courts
have held that extending a noncitizen’s custody solely on the basis of an
immigration detainer violates the Fourth Amendment. 195 Recently, a district

09-16-senate-leader-de-leons-california-values-act-clears-legislature
[https://perma.cc/3894-WUQS]
(articulating both public safety and resistance to President Trump’s indiscriminate enforcement approach
as reasons for supporting California sanctuary bill).
191 See, e.g., NIK THEODORE, DEP’T OF URBAN PLANNING & POLICY, UNIV. OF ILL. AT CHI.,
INSECURE COMMUNITIES: LATINO PERCEPTIONS OF POLICE INVOLVEMENT IN IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT 3 (2013); Jason A. Cade & Meghan L. Flanagan, Five Steps to a Better U: Improving the
Crime-Fighting Visa, 21 RICH. PUB. INT. L. REV. 85, 102–06, 109–11 (2018); Marjorie S. Zatz & Hilary
Smith, Immigration, Crime, and Victimization: Rhetoric and Reality, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 141,
150 (2012).
192 See, e.g., ROBERT J. SAMPSON, GREAT AMERICAN CITY: CHICAGO AND THE ENDURING
NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECT 251–60 (2012) (describing evidence that places with high concentrations of
immigrants have lower crime rates); Tom K. Wong, The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the
FOR
AM.
PROGRESS
(Jan.
26,
2017,
1:00
AM),
Economy,
CTR.
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/reports/2017/01/26/297366/the-effects-ofsanctuary-policies-on-crime-and-the-economy [https://perma.cc/2JCE-8QR6] (“Crime is statistically
significantly lower in sanctuary counties compared to nonsanctuary counties.”).
193 See, e.g., INT’L ASSOC. OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, PROTECTING CIVIL RIGHTS: A LEADERSHIP GUIDE
FOR
STATE,
LOCAL
AND
TRIBAL
LAW
ENFORCEMENT
153–91
(2006),
http://www.theiacp.org/portals/0/pdfs/PCR_LdrshpGde_Part3.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZG4B-V687]. For
an analysis of how the integration of immigration and criminal enforcement can lead to racial profiling
and other policing distortions, see Armacost, supra note 186, at 1223–31; Cade, Policing the Immigration
Police, supra note 78, at 184 (discussing connections between unconstitutional racial profiling and local
enforcement agencies that prioritize the apprehension of immigrants); Cade, supra note 47, at 1757
(arguing that ICE’s integration with the criminal justice system, and in particular the misdemeanor
system, can create corrosive feedback loops that undermine the reliability and integrity of both systems);
Eagly, supra note 113, at 1150; Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 844 (2015);
Kevin R. Johnson, Doubling Down on Racial Discrimination: The Racially Disparate Impacts of CrimeBased Removals, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 993, 1026 (2016); and Carrie L. Rosenbaum, The Natural
Persistence of Racial Disparities in Crime-Based Removals, 13 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 532, 545 (2017).
194 Lasch, supra note 181; Villazor & Gulasekaram, supra note 44, at 26.
195 See, e.g., Villars v. Kubiatowski, 45 F. Supp. 3d 791, 807–08 (N.D. Ill. 2014); Miranda-Olivares
v. Clackamas County, No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at *5 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014); Morales
v. Chadbourne, 996 F. Supp. 2d 19, 29–34 (D.R.I. 2014), aff’d, 793 F.3d 208 (1st Cir. 2015); Galarza v.
Szalczyk, No. 10-cv-06815, 2012 WL 1080020 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2012), rev’d on other grounds,
745 F.3d 634, 642 (3d Cir. 2014); Lunn v. Commonwealth, 78 N.E.3d 1143, 1156–60 (Mass. 2017)
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court in Texas enjoined a state law requiring local authorities to comply with
detainer requests, in part due to the likelihood that Fourth Amendment
violations will result. 196 Authority to arrest or detain requires probable cause
or a judicially sanctioned warrant, and an immigration agent’s decision to
issue a detainer provides neither. 197 Relatedly, courts have held that
immigration detainers are not mandatory (thus avoiding the Tenth
Amendment’s anti-commandeering rule), and as a result, it is the local
agency that bears liability for any constitutional violations, rather than
federal authorities.198
A third set of reasons for sanctuary policies is fiscal. Localities
complying with immigration detainer requests bear the cost of extended
detention and are typically not fully reimbursed or compensated by the
federal government. 199 Moreover, time spent managing detainer requests is
time away from other law enforcement tasks. Noncooperation or limitedcooperation measures thus “preserve economic resources by limiting police
expenditures to nonimmigration-related crimes and by ensuring that police
personnel time is not expended on making immigration-related inquiries.”200
In the face of threats by the Trump Administration to withhold federal
funding from sanctuary jurisdictions, 201 some jurisdictions obtained a
(holding that local law enforcement lacks authority to continue detention of noncitizen solely for purposes
of immigration enforcement).
196 City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 264 F. Supp. 3d 744, 809 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (“[T]he Court has found
that enforcement of the mandatory detainer provisions will inevitably lead to Fourth Amendment
violations.”), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 890 F.3d 164 (5th Cir. 2018). On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
panel held that plaintiffs could only challenge Fourth Amendment violations resulting from detainers on
a case-by-case basis. 890 F.3d at 185–90.
197 See, e.g., County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 510 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“[C]ivil
detainer requests are often not supported by an individualized determination of probable cause that a
crime has been committed.”); Moreno v. Napolitano, 213 F. Supp. 3d 999, 1003 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (holding
that ICE lacked statutory authority to detain without warrant in circumstances of that case absent a finding
of flight risk before a warrant can be obtained).
198 See, e.g., Galarza, 745 F.3d at 640–41 (holding, along with the First, Second, Fifth, and Sixth
Circuits, that construing detainers as mandatory would violate the anti-commandeering rule of the Tenth
Amendment); Villars, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 802; Miranda-Olivares, 2014 WL 1414305, at *5.
199 See, e.g., Hing, supra note 184, at 310–11.
200 Elias, supra note 185, at 815.
201 Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed.
Reg. 8,793 (Jan. 30, 2017); Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Charlie Savage, White House to States: Shield the
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
27,
2017),
Undocumented
and
Lose
Police
Funding,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/27/us/politics/sanctuary-cities-jeff-sessions.html
[https://perma.cc/XH2R-BRQV]; Forrest G. Read IV, Trump Administration Stops Law Enforcement
Funds to Chicago, Sanctuary City, and Gets Sued, NAT’L L. REV. (Aug. 22, 2017),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/trump-administration-stops-law-enforcement-funds-to-chicagosanctuary-city-and-gets [https://perma.cc/79G5-JP6B] (reporting on Chicago’s lawsuit challenging the
Trump Administration’s decision to condition JAG grants to law enforcement on local cooperation with
immigration officials).
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preliminary nationwide injunction prohibiting the federal government from
coercing cities and counties into assisting immigration authorities. 202 There
are two main components to the argument. First, the Executive Branch is
limited in its ability to attach new conditions on congressionally authorized
funding streams. 203 Second, the federal government cannot
unconstitutionally coerce states, municipalities, campuses, or private
institutions into assistance with matters that are squarely within the federal
government’s domain. 204 Conversely, law enforcement is a core police
power, reserved to the states in our federal system. 205
A few cities have taken steps to ensure that noncitizen residents facing
deportation have the assistance of legal counsel.206 In New York City, for
example, all noncitizens who cannot afford an attorney are provided with
representation through a combination of private and public funding
sources. 207 Measures like this can have a significant effect on immigration
outcomes, as the assistance of counsel has been shown to be crucial in
202

Vivian Yee, Judge Blocks Trump Effort to Withhold Money from Sanctuary Cities, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/25/us/judge-blocks-trump-sanctuary-cities.html
[https://perma.cc/K5ST-K7MT]; Joel Rubin, L.A. Looks to Join Fight Against Trump Administration over
Threats to Withhold Anti-Crime Funds for ‘Sanctuary’ Cities, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2017, 4:20 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-sanctuary-city-lawsuit-20170822-story.html
[https://perma.cc/67RB-65YE].
203 See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 296 (7th Cir. 2018) (upholding lower court
injunction against Trump Administration’s withholding of funds pursuant to access and notice
conditions); Annie Lai & Christopher N. Lasch, Crimmigration Resistance and the Case of Sanctuary
City Defunding, 57 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 539, 573–80 (delineating the constitutional requirement that
funding conditions be germane to Congress’s purpose and applying these principles to the Trump
Administration’s efforts to curb sanctuary policies through funding restrictions).
204 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitutionality of Withholding Federal Funds from
Sanctuary Cities, L.A. LAW., Apr. 2017, at 60, 60.
205 See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1451 (1987); Hing,
supra note 184, at 273–80 (arguing that the Tenth Amendment and principles of federalism protect state
and local law enforcement decisions not to cooperate with federal immigration enforcement); cf. Jason
A. Cade, Deporting the Pardoned, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 355, 402–04 (2012) (arguing that federalism
principles require an unequivocally clear statement from Congress that federal immigration officials can
deport someone on the basis of a conviction that has been pardoned or expunged under state law).
206 Maura Ewing, Should Taxpayers Sponsor Attorneys for Undocumented Immigrants?, ATLANTIC
(May 4, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/should-taxpayers-sponsorattorneys-for-undocumented-immigrants/525162 [https://perma.cc/GQ7M-TDSY] (discussing right-tocounsel measures in Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, Washington, D.C., New York City, and
Austin, as well as statewide initiatives on the table in New York and California); New York State Becomes
First in the Nation to Provide Lawyers for All Immigrants Detained and Facing Deportation, VERA INST.
(Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.vera.org/newsroom/press-releases/new-york-state-becomes-first-in-thenation-to-provide-lawyers-for-all-immigrants-detained-and-facing-deportation [https://perma.cc/H5B2P964].
207 Liz Robbins & J. David Goodman, De Blasio and Council Agree, and Disagree, on Immigrants,
N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/06/nyregion/de-blasio-and-council-agreeand-disagree-on-immigrants.html [https://perma.cc/8LK8-UFH5].
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ensuring that noncitizens are able to defend against removal. 208 Some states
and cities have also implemented integrative sanctuary measures, such as the
provision of drivers’ licenses or identity cards. 209 While not my primary
focus here, I briefly touch on the consequences of these kinds of immigrantwelcoming activities in Section IV.D.
B. Sanctuary Churches
Today’s religious sanctuaries are only the most recent iteration of a
deep lineage dating back at least to biblical times. 210 The most direct
precedent is the Sanctuary Movement of the 1980s, which provided legal
screening, shelter, and other assistance to refugees from El Salvador and
Guatemala who were widely perceived to have been unfairly denied
asylum. 211 At its peak, the Movement consisted of over 100 churches and
synagogues, with at least 20,000 individual participants or supporters
engaged in the effort. 212 Members of these congregations believed that the
refugees faced fatal danger if returned to their home countries and felt
compelled to help the federal government fulfill its obligations under
domestic and international asylum law. 213
Professor Barbara Bezdek described that Sanctuary Movement as “civil
initiative,” which she defined as the “conscientious practice of people joined
by a faith-based understanding of the importance and possibility of
208

See infra notes 280–81 and accompanying text; cf. Villazor & Gulasekaram, supra note 44, at
28–29 (“The provision of legal services may perhaps be a quintessential form of safe haven.”).
209 See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 12801.9 (West 2016) (allowing undocumented noncitizens to obtain
driver’s licenses with proof of identity and state residence); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/6-105.1 (West
2013) (allowing undocumented noncitizens to obtain driver’s licenses with proof of residency for at least
one year); N.Y.C., N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 3-115(d)(1)(vi) (2018) (allowing undocumented noncitizens to
obtain city identification cards with proof of identity).
210 For accounts of earlier sanctuary movements, see, for example, Bezdek, supra note 22, at 928–
31; Kristina M. Campbell, Operation Sojourner: The Government Infiltration of the Sanctuary Movement
in the 1980s and Its Legacy on the Modern Central American Refugee Crisis, 13 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 474
(2017).
211 See generally Villazor, supra note 21, at 138–42 (outlining the historical background of
sanctuaries and highlighting the efforts of churches and individuals in the 1980s to offer assistance to
Central American migrants believed to have been wrongly denied asylum by the United States); Gabrielle
Emanuel, Religious Communities Continue the Long Tradition of Offering Sanctuary, NPR (Mar. 14,
2017, 4:28 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/03/14/519307698/religious-communities-continue-the-longtradition-of-offering-sanctuary [https://perma.cc/SY4N-LVMZ]. As part of a legal settlement, the federal
government later admitted it had not properly adjudicated the asylees’ claims. See Am. Baptist Churches
v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991). See generally Campbell, supra note 189, at 101
(describing this history).
212 Kathleen L. Villarruel, Note, The Underground Railroad and the Sanctuary Movement: A
Comparison of History, Litigation, and Values, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1429, 1433 (1987).
213 See generally Bezdek, supra note 22, at 935–39 (describing the motivations behind this sanctuary
movement); Campbell, supra note 210 (same); Villarruel, supra note 212, at 1433–34 (same).

474

113:433 (2018)

Sanctuaries as Equitable Delegation

responding to the sufferings of strangers, by enacting a way for society to
comply with human rights laws although the Government persisted in
violating them.” 214 The federal government viewed these activities
differently, however, ultimately prosecuting participants in the Movement
for “harboring or transporting . . . aliens” in violation of Section 274 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). 215 In 1989, some Sanctuary
Movement members, including founder John Fife, were found guilty of
violating this provision. 216 None served jail time, however, and the
Movement continued. 217 Eventually, in separate but related litigation, the
government conceded that its handling of the Central American asylum
claims had been improper. 218
Now, in the face of the Trump Administration’s mass enforcement
approach, more than 1000 churches, synagogues, and mosques throughout
the country have loosely organized as the New Sanctuary Movement. 219 The
New Sanctuary Movement has spread even to locations that historically had
little or no involvement with sanctuary efforts or immigrant advocacy, such
214

Bezdek, supra note 22, at 911.
Id. at 902. The current harboring provision of the INA provides for criminal penalties for “[a]ny
person who . . . knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or remains
in the United States in violation of law, conceals, harbors, or shields from detection, or attempts to
conceal, harbor, or shield from detection, such alien in any place, including any building or any means of
transportation.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A) (2012).
216 See United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 671 (9th Cir. 1989).
217 See Clyde Haberman, Trump and the Battle over Sanctuary in America, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/05/us/sanctuary-cities-movement-1980s-political-asylum.
html [https://perma.cc/3AJE-M45B].
218 See Am. Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796, 797 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (discussing
settlement of litigation regarding the government’s improper handling of Central American asylum
claims); see also Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549, 565–68 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming
findings by the district court that INS violated the rights of Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum
applicants).
219 See MYRNA OROZCO & NOEL ANDERSEN, SANCTUARY IN THE AGE OF TRUMP: THE RISE OF THE
MOVEMENT A YEAR INTO THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION 6 (2018), https://www.
sanctuarynotdeportation.org/uploads/7/6/9/1/76912017/sanctuary_in_the_age_of_trump_january_2018.
pdf [https://perma.cc/WH8J-PB9L] (“As of January 2018, there are more than 1,110 congregations in the
Sanctuary Movement, showing the faith resistance continues to grow against harsh and inhumane
immigration policies.” (emphasis omitted)); Ashley Archibald, Mosques, Churches, Synagogues, and
Temples Rekindle the Sanctuary Movement to Protect Refugees and Immigrants from Deportation, REAL
CHANGE NEWS (June 21, 2017), http://realchangenews.org/2017/06/21/mosques-churches-synagoguesand-temples-rekindle-sanctuary-movement-protect-refugees-and
[https://perma.cc/4NGM-VGHW];
Sarah Quezada, How Churches Can Give Sanctuary and Still Support the Law, CHRISTIANITY TODAY
(Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.christianitytoday.com/women/2017/march/how-churches-can-givesanctuary-to-immigrants-and-still-sup.html [https://perma.cc/KS8E-297N]. This is a dramatic increase
from 2013, when just over a dozen churches were known to provide sanctuary to undocumented families.
Elizabeth Evans & Yonat Shimron, ‘Sanctuary Churches’ Vow to Shield Immigrants from Trump
Crackdown, RELIGION NEWS SERV. (Nov. 18, 2016), https://religionnews.com/2016/11/18/sanctuarychurches-vow-to-shield-immigrants-from-trump-crackdown [https://perma.cc/YZG3-NSTL].
215
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as Grand Rapids, Michigan, and Twin Cities, Iowa. 220 Congregations
partaking in this Movement share a commitment to keeping the families of
deportable noncitizens intact, particularly those that include U.S. citizen
children. The forms of support vary. Most significantly, a number of
churches have provided physical refuge to persons facing removal despite
highly sympathetic circumstances. In some cases, these actions have
influenced federal enforcers to exercise discretion to the benefit of the
noncitizen. 221 Other less extreme but nevertheless important assistance
regularly provided by church sanctuaries includes “know-your-rights”
trainings, legal consultations, or attorney representation. 222
Today’s religious sanctuary actors seek to avoid the legal liability that
befell the earlier movement’s participants in part by providing sanctuary
openly. In this way, they can argue that they are not actually concealing
potentially deportable noncitizens. 223 Moreover, the congregations
acknowledge that ICE officials are lawfully entitled to carry out enforcement
on church property so long as they have a valid warrant to do so. 224 Indeed,
congregations and participants in the New Sanctuary Movement have
become savvy about the Fourth Amendment and related constitutional
protections for private property. 225 Thus far, ICE has adhered to longstanding
agency policy not to conduct enforcement actions in churches and other

220

Andrea Castillo, Churches Answer Call to Offer Immigrants Sanctuary in an Uneasy Mix of
Politics and Compassion, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-mesanctuary-churches-20170301-story.html [https://perma.cc/A88C-TWQ7].
221 See, e.g., Etehad, supra note 3; Kyung Lah et al., Underground Network Readies Homes to Hide
Undocumented
Immigrants,
CNN
(Feb.
26,
2017,
8:46
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/23/us/california-immigrant-safe-houses/index.html
[https://perma.cc/
AG9N-MQVM]; see also infra note 283 (citing reports of sanctuary activities leading to favorable
exercises of discretion).
222 See, e.g., Emily Fontenot, Why Are Churches Choosing to Provide Legal Services to Immigrants?,
ALLIANCE,
http://theimmigrationalliance.org/churches-choosing-provide-legal-servicesIMMIGR.
immigrants [https://perma.cc/34AM-3ACV]; Christopher Smart, Leaked Document Offers Peek at How
Church Helps Undocumented Immigrant Mormons, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Mar. 10, 2017, 12:20 AM),
http://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=5006677&itype=CMSID
[https://perma.cc/Q6HP-249H]
(“Congregational leaders in the LDS Church should provide welfare assistance to undocumented Mormon
immigrants as they would to any other church member, according to a purported policy paper from the
Utah-based faith.”).
223 See Quezada, supra note 219.
224 See, e.g., Manya Brachear Pashman, Cupich to Priests: No Entry for Immigration Agents Without
Warrants, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 1, 2017, 5:30 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/
breaking/ct-cardinal-cupich-immigration-directive-20170301-story.html [https://perma.cc/5587-VV5Z].
225 See Villazor & Gulasekaram, supra note 20, at 20–21 (discussing a variety of legal strategies that
churches have taken to maximize protection of noncitizens seeking sanctuary in their buildings).
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“sensitive locations,” 226 and no members of the New Sanctuary Movement
have been prosecuted under the harboring provision of the INA. 227
C. Sanctuary Campuses
Sanctuary campuses are public or private institutions of higher learning
that admit undocumented students 228 and resist efforts by federal agents to
obtain information about these students or to conduct enforcement activities
on campus. 229 As of this writing, about eighty campuses have adopted
noncooperation policies. 230 Around sixteen have officially declared
themselves to be “sanctuary campuses.” 231 More commonly, universities
226

See Memorandum from John Morton, supra note 2, at 1 (indicating that as a policy matter ICE
will not enforce immigration law in “sensitive locations” such as churches).
227 See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2012). But see Ryan Devereaux, “We’re Gonna Take
Everyone”—Border Patrol Targets Prominent Humanitarian Group As Criminal Organization,
INTERCEPT (Apr. 30, 2018, 3:00 PM), https://theintercept.com/2018/04/30/were-gonna-take-everyoneborder-patrol-targets-prominent-humanitarian-group-as-criminal-organization [https://perma.cc/66TDE6JW] (reporting on arrest and lodging of federal harboring charges against Scott Warren, a volunteer
with the Unitarian Universalist Church of Tucson-affiliated organization No More Deaths, for providing
aid to migrants near the border).
228 For examples of states allowing undocumented noncitizens to attend universities and, in some
cases, qualify for in-state tuition, see CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68130.5 (West 2018); 110 ILL. COMP. STAT.
305/7e-5 (West 2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 76-731a (West 2004); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 85-502 (West
2016); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-1-4.6 (West 2015); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6206 (McKinney 2018); TEX.
EDUC. CODE ANN. § 54.052 (West 2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53B-8-106 (West 2002); and WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 28B.15.012 (West 2018). A few states even allow unauthorized resident students to qualify
for state scholarships to public universities. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 66021.7 (West 2011); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 28B.92.010 (West 2014).
229 See generally Julia Preston, Campuses Wary of Offering ‘Sanctuary’ to Undocumented Students,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/26/education/edlife/sanctuary-forundocumented-students.html [https://perma.cc/QJU8-4424].
230 Map
of
Sanctuary
Campuses
on
Oct.
4,
2018,
GOOGLE
MAPS,
https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=1LcIME474-lYWbTf_xQChIhSSN30&hl=en&ll=36.
2039797443434%2C-113.89148150000005&z=3 [https://perma.cc/ZW4Q-2K7X] (mapping United
States campuses with sanctuary policies and roughly coding the strength of their expressed commitment);
see, e.g., Kathleen Megan, Wesleyan Declares Itself a Sanctuary Campus for Undocumented Immigrants,
HARTFORD COURANT (Nov. 23, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.courant.com/education/hc-college--trumpsanctuary-1123-20161122-story.html [https://perma.cc/J5K2-L944] (reporting that Wesleyan University
President Michael Roth publicly stated that Wesleyan “would not cooperate with any efforts to round up
people, unless . . . forced to”).
231 Map of Sanctuary Campuses on Oct. 4, 2018, supra note 230; see, e.g., Chris Lydgate, Kroger
Declares Reed a Sanctuary College, REED MAG. (Nov. 18, 2016, 11:14 AM),
http://www.reed.edu/reed_magazine/sallyportal/posts/2016/sanctuary-college.html
[https://perma.cc/
5VM4-RS6P]; Megan, supra note 230; Wim Wiewel, Portland State Is a Sanctuary University, INSIDE
PSU, https://www.pdx.edu/insidepsu/portland-state-is-a-sanctuary-university [https://perma.cc/QBF86M7T] (declaring Portland State University to be a sanctuary campus, by university president);
Resolution No. 161215-IX-346, City Coll. of S.F. Bd. of Trs., City College of San Francisco Joins the
City and County of San Francisco in Affirming Its Sanctuary Status for all People of San Francisco (Dec.
15, 2016), http://www.ccsf.edu/BOT/2016/December/346r.pdf [https://perma.cc/CLR9-9MYE].
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have simply implemented sanctuary-like measures, particularly policies that
limit information sharing without a court order or deny federal enforcers
campus access without a warrant. 232 Although less frequent, public schools
are another emerging sanctuary site. 233
As with other sanctuary entities, such measures have not gone without
controversy and challenge. Lawmakers have introduced bills, for instance,
that would deprive sanctuary campuses of various sources of funding. 234
Moreover, public universities and colleges are administered by employees
of the state, and accordingly, it is possible that federal immigration law
restricts their ability to limit information sharing with federal enforcers. 235
Yet, as Professors Rose Cuison Villazor and Pratheepan Gulasekaram
observe, federal privacy laws, as well as the unique role of universities as
“institutions . . . tasked with educating and protecting students,” provide
strong arguments that sanctuary campuses are operating on safe ground. 236
The Federal Education Rights and Privacy Act prohibits the disclosure of
confidential student information to any third party, 237 at the risk of significant

232

Map of Sanctuary Campuses on Oct. 4, 2018, supra note 230; see, e.g., Aaron Holmes, University
to Provide Sanctuary, Financial Support for Undocumented Students, COLUM. SPECTATOR, (Nov. 22,
2016, 7:54 PM), https://www.columbiaspectator.com/news/2016/11/21/university-provide-sanctuaryfinancial-support-undocumented-students [https://perma.cc/C6V8-M3ZY] (describing Columbia
University’s policies not to allow immigration authorities on campus without a warrant or to share student
information unless subpoenaed).
233 In May 2017, for example, an ICE agent attempted to apprehend a fourth grader at a public school
in Queens, New York, but was turned away by school officials. Alex Eriksen, ICE Agent Tried to
Apprehend a 4th-Grader but Was Turned Away by the School, YAHOO! LIFESTYLE (May 14, 2017),
https://www.yahoo.com/lifestyle/ice-agent-tried-apprehend-4th-grader-turned-away-school224058706.html [https://perma.cc/F6E9-HYQA]. Some schools have now undertaken policies that limit
ICE’s access to potentially deportable students or their information. See, e.g., Rafi Schwartz, New York
City to ICE: Stay Out of Our Schools, SPLINTER NEWS (Mar. 22, 2017, 12:36 PM),
https://splinternews.com/new-york-city-to-ice-stay-out-of-our-schools-1793859239 [https://perma.cc/
TFG4-PXA7] (“New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio announced that city school employees have been
instructed to turn away Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency officials attempting to enter school
buildings unless they presented a valid, judge-ordered warrant.”).
234 See, e.g., No Funding for Sanctuary Campuses Act, H.R. 483, 115th Cong. (2017); H.B. 1042,
91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2017) (died in committee); H.B. 37, 154th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Ga. 2017) (passed); S. Enrolled Act 423, 120th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2017) (passed); H.
File 265, 87th Gen. Assemb. (Iowa 2017) (introduced); S.B. 4, 85th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017) (passed);
Brian Lyman, Alabama House Approves ‘Sanctuary Campus’ Bill, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER (Feb. 14,
2017, 9:46 PM), https://www.montgomeryadvertiser.com/story/news/politics/southunionstreet/
2017/02/14/alabama-house-approves-sanctuary-campus-bill/97929404 [https://perma.cc/T3RN-H9WR]
(reporting on passage of a bill that would authorize the state to withhold funds from sanctuary campuses).
235 See 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (2012) (providing that no law can prevent “any government entity or
official from sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service information
regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual”).
236 Villazor & Gulasekaram, supra note 44, at 31.
237 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1) (2012).
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loss of funding, 238 and there is no reason to view information about
immigration status as exempt from this restriction.
Additionally, because sanctuary campuses (both public and private)
sometimes provide housing to undocumented students, they too might face
prosecution for “harboring” undocumented immigrants in violation of
Section 274 of the INA. 239 But liability under this provision seems unlikely
for a number of reasons. First, although Congress has restricted the access of
noncitizens to federal educational loans and other governmental benefits, the
statute expressly allows states to pass laws that make “an alien who is not
lawfully present in the United States . . . eligible for any State or local public
benefit for which such alien would otherwise be ineligible.” 240 A statutory
scheme that permitted universities to openly enroll undocumented
noncitizens pursuant to a valid state law but then held them criminally liable
for providing housing to those same students would be exceedingly
inconsistent, to say the least. On a related score, the Fifth Circuit recently
observed that, as a general matter, “there is no reasonable interpretation by
which merely renting housing or providing social services to an illegal alien
constitutes ‘harboring . . . that person from detection.’” 241 For all these
reasons, one can surmise that the anti-harboring provision would not extend
to this educational context, although it remains to be seen whether the
government might nevertheless attempt to prosecute on this basis. 242
IV. THE EQUITY-INFLUENCING DYNAMICS OF SANCTUARIES
The previous Part described the three main forms of sanctuary that have
taken hold and showed that each has its own legal and policy justifications.
This Part defends these resistance measures on more systemic grounds. I
argue that when federal enforcers fail to exercise equitable discretion
appropriately in a system that requires prosecutorial leniency in order to
achieve proportionality and fairness, the locus of this discretionary need
shifts yet further upstream—to the police, prosecutors, public defenders,
churches, and other local institutions that encounter noncitizens before the
federal government has the opportunity to take enforcement actions against

238

Id. § 1234c(a).
Villazor & Gulasekaram, supra note 44, at 31.
240 See 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d) (titled “State authority to provide for eligibility of illegal aliens for State
and local public benefits”); id. §§ 1611, 1623(a), 1641 (restricting undocumented persons’ eligibility for
federal educational loans).
241 See, e.g., Cruz v. Abbott, 849 F.3d 594, 602 (5th Cir. 2017) (omission in original).
242 See also infra notes 344–46 and accompanying text (arguing that courts should endeavor to issue
rulings that protect legitimacy-enhancing functions of sanctuaries in the face of government attempts to
bring harboring prosecutions).
239
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them. Thus, rather than subvert law, noncooperative sanctuary policies—
public and private alike—can promote legitimacy in the removal system.
The current executors of the removal system see enforcement targets as
interchangeable numbers or chits—nameless, faceless others, to be
eliminated or reduced—rather than individual human beings with unique life
stories and loved ones. But this way of thinking is a mistake and untrue to
our better traditions of justice in this country. In a system that administers
liberty-depriving sanctions like detention and deportation, individuals who
have built lives in the United States over time should be able to expect
particular, if not categorical, evaluation on equity grounds. 243 High stakes
demand commensurate scrutiny, process, and understanding. 244 As in
criminal law, immigration enforcement’s “currency is ultimately life and
death, prosperity and ruin, freedom and imprisonment.” 245 Noncitizens—as
human beings living, working, learning, and parenting in their
communities—are entitled to contextualized consideration of the
circumstances underlying both the basis of their potential deportation and the
resulting consequences for themselves, their families, and their communities.
Seen in this light, equitable discretion is essential to “complete justice.”246
To avoid illegitimate consequences, enforcement determinations must
consider not solely legality but also normative accuracy. 247 As Professor Josh
Bowers has explained regarding the administration of criminal law, legal
accuracy “attends to the rules,” while normative accuracy “attends to the
particulars.” 248 Both are essential to the achievement of complete justice. 249
But when they are in conflict, normative concerns should usually prevail.250
Operating in the context of the Trump Administration’s indiscriminate, mass
approach to immigration enforcement, the efforts of sanctuaries are
particularly important to the achievement of normatively correct results,
243 Cf. Bowers, supra note 79, at 212 (“[M]eaningful understanding is not asymmetric. Nor may we
leave it to sovereign prerogative. We are owed understanding. It is our rightful claim. It is the job of all
branches of government to deliver it.” (footnote omitted)).
244 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348–49 (1976) (holding that as the stakes of the private
interest affected rise in importance, so too must the procedures to guard against erroneous deprivations).
245 Jeremy Waldron, How Law Protects Dignity, 71 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 200, 217 (2012).
246 Josh Bowers, Upside-Down Juries, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1655, 1664 (2017).
247 Bowers, supra note 34, at 1019–21.
248 Bowers, supra note 246, at 1664.
249 Nussbaum, supra note 88, at 93–96 (“Equity may be regarded as a correcting and completing of
legal justice.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Waldron, supra note 245, at 212 (arguing that to focus
solely on “the clarity and determinacy of rules . . . is to slice in half, to truncate, what law and legality
rest upon”).
250 Nussbaum, supra note 88, at 93 (observing that in Aristotelian accounts of justice, equity is
superior to “strict legal justice”); Solum, supra note 87, at 194–207 (arguing that “the virtue of justice”
is superior to strict legal justice).
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though they also contribute to legal accuracy and procedural fairness in some
cases. 251 The nature of the legitimacy-enhancing force varies with the type of
sanctuary measure at issue. The following Sections elaborate on these points.
A. Equitable First-Level Screens
Sanctuary policies that limit cooperation or access for purposes of
immigration enforcement erect a first-level equitable screen in the removal
system. Enforcement systems administering sanctions as severe as
banishment must somewhere afford the capacity to appreciate claims of
equity, hardship, and mitigation. 252 However, criminal court sentencing
judges and, for the most part, immigration judges no longer have much
authority to adjust the application of deportation law, even in extremely
compelling circumstances. At immigration officials’ prerogative, moreover,
many categories of noncitizens can be denied access to immigration courts
altogether. 253 In the new regime, the gears are fixed, and executive officials
control the equitable levers. When the eyes of these officials are closed to
humanity and hardship, they ignore the contextual demands of immigration
law. In such circumstances, it falls to local and state governments, public
defenders, police and prosecutors, sentencing judges, and even private
institutions like campuses and churches to erect equitable screens around
noncitizens for whom removal would be disproportionate.
President Trump has described sanctuary city activities as the “unlawful
nullification of Federal law.” 254 But this analogy is imperfect. In the criminal
context, nullification refers to an ex post decision to ignore state evidence
presented in a formal prosecution that establishes a defendant’s guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. 255 To be sure, sanctuary actions sometimes occur after

251 Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Frills Textualism, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2041, 2043 (2006)
(recounting in a book review an interpretive approach to statutes that “considers the . . . normative context
for applying the statute,” such that “statutes will not be applied in ways that are unreasonable”).
252 Cf. Nussbaum, supra note 88, at 87–88, 92 (explaining why criminal justice systems should
“refuse[] to demand retribution without understanding the whole story”).
253 Jill E. Family, A Broader View of the Immigration Adjudication Problem, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
595, 611–32 (2009) (analyzing the mechanisms that allow the government to remove noncitizens without
utilizing the immigration adjudication process); Koh, supra note 25 (same).
254 Elise Foley & Marina Fang, White House, Trump Attack Judicial Branch Again by Misconstruing
POST
(Apr.
26,
2017,
10:57
AM),
‘Sanctuary
City’
Ruling,
HUFFINGTON
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trump-attacks-court-immigration-sanctuary-cities_us_
590098e7e4b0af6d718a2d99 [https://perma.cc/6SUN-T4QB] (reporting that President Trump
characterized sanctuary city policies as “engaged in the dangerous and unlawful nullification of Federal
law”).
255 Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REV. 253, 253–54 (1996).
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deportability has already been determined; 256 however, these instances are
uncommon. Most often the impact of sanctuaries will be further upstream in
the process, influencing which noncitizens come into contact with federal
enforcers in the first place.
A more apt analogy from criminal law is that of the grand jury. In the
case of criminal grand juries, “equitable charging discretion is not only
institutionally acceptable but welcome and anticipated.” 257 Although the role
of subfederal actors in the removal system might at first blush seem to be
quite distinct from the grand jury’s role in the criminal system, a functional
closer look reveals key similarities. 258 The federal immigration system rarely
makes its own determination about whether a particular noncitizen is actually
dangerous or likely to transgress societal norms. Instead, the enforcement
scheme directly relies on local law enforcement actors to determine which
noncitizens should be priorities for removal, using the proxies of arrest and
conviction. 259 Thus, local law enforcement is already deeply enmeshed in the
immigration enforcement scheme. 260
Under the Trump Administration, federal enforcers undertake removal
measures with precious little consideration of the noncitizen’s character,
conduct, and contributions. Local police, as well as other local officials and
institutions such as schools and campuses, thus function as an upstream
normative screen, determining whom to present and whom to shield from
federal authorities. In effect, they operate as an equitable grand jury, deciding
whether immigration enforcement is justified on moral or prudential
256 Note also that deportability determinations occur through much thinner processes than those
afforded criminal defendants, and the government enjoys a significantly more relaxed burden of proof.
See Cade, supra note 5, at 14–17 (explaining the government’s “clear and convincing” burden of proof
and other procedural aspects of immigration court).
257 Bowers, supra note 246, at 1672; see also Niki Kuckes, The Democratic Prosecutor: Explaining
the Constitutional Function of the Federal Grand Jury, 94 GEO. L.J. 1265, 1269 n.19 (2006) (noting that
“jury nullification . . . criticisms do not readily apply to grand juries, which have the valid power to
decline prosecution even on meritorious criminal charges”); Ric Simmons, Re-Examining the Grand
Jury: Is There Room for Democracy in the Criminal Justice System?, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1, 48 (2002) (“The
term ‘grand jury nullification’ is . . . a misnomer because it equates the grand juror’s proper exercise of
discretionary judgment with a trial juror’s improper decision to acquit those whom have been proven
guilty.”).
258 For explorations of the similarities and differences between criminal and removal systems, see
Cade, supra note 5, at 54–58; Austin T. Fragomen, Jr., The “Uncivil” Nature of Deportation: Fourth and
Fifth Amendment Rights and the Exclusionary Rule, 45 BROOK. L. REV. 29, 34–35 (1978); and Stephen
H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms,
64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 481–82 (2007).
259 Cade, supra note 32, at 57; see also Cade, supra note 205, at 365 (“Although either federal or
state convictions can fall within the INA’s categories of deportable offenses, the federal government
primarily depends on states and their criminal justice systems to determine in the first instance
whether . . . immigrants are criminals and therefore deportable under federal law.”).
260 Villazor & Gulasekaram, supra note 44, at 39.
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grounds. 261 Because the federal government already uses subfederal actors to
generate what could functionally be described as immigration enforcement
indictments, it is not a far stretch to acknowledge the appropriateness of the
subfederal actor’s corresponding role to provide an equitable screen in that
same context.
Local authorities and laypeople may be better positioned to make these
kinds of equitable determinations than one might initially surmise.
Proportionality considerations are less about the determination of technical
culpability than the evaluation of normative principles such as
blameworthiness, social responsibility, fairness, hardship, and equality. 262
The determination of moral culpability and mitigation “arises out of the
exercise of human intuition and practical reason, applied concretely to the
particular offender and his act.” 263 Whether the removal of a particular
noncitizen is socially positive—for the immigrant, his family, and the
broader community—is a highly contextual consideration.
Local institutions and entities are more in tune with local context and
values than federal actors. 264 In this respect, police are not solely law
enforcers; they are also caretakers of their communities. To be sure,
institutional biases and constraints will always exert influence on decisionmaking by police and other law enforcement agents. 265 Nevertheless, like
public defenders, prosecutors, and sentencing judges, police officers likely
will be more in tune with local social norms and attitudes than technocratic
lawmakers and federal enforcers, who operate at considerable geographic

261 Cf. Bowers, supra note 246, at 1672 (arguing that grand juries should perform an equitable
function in the criminal context).
262 Id. at 1666 (“Laypeople are uniquely well suited to evaluate normative principles, like fairness,
dignity, autonomy, mercy, forgiveness, coercion, and even equality.”).
263 Josh Bowers, Blame by Proxy: Political Retributivism & Its Problems, A Response to Dan
Markel, 1 VA. J. CRIM. L. 135, 136 (2012).
264 Daniel I. Morales, Transforming Crime-Based Deportation, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698 (2017)
(offering an extended and sympathetic defense of this point); cf. JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY:
THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 18 (1994) (“Local jurors . . . know the conscience of
the community and can apply the law in ways that resonate with the community’s moral values and
common sense.”); Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure,
86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1168 (1998) (arguing that local communities are as well-situated as anyone to evaluate
whether enforcement tactics “embody a reasonable trade-off between liberty and order”); Lemos, supra
note 95, at 750 (“[S]tate enforcement authority can help match enforcement policy to the preferences of
local citizens.”).
265 For example, local law enforcement agencies rely on state and federal funding sources, whose
preferences regarding immigration enforcement must be placated or negotiated. See Bowers, supra note
246, at 1659 (discussing law enforcement biases and institutional constraints that hamper the application
of equitable principles). See generally Lai & Lasch, supra note 203 (describing the dynamics at play when
state and local law enforcement accept federal funding).
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and emotional detachment. 266 While local policymakers, police, and
prosecutors are unlikely to let criminal activity by noncitizens (or anyone
else) go unpunished, in sanctuary jurisdictions they may nonetheless
conclude that in many cases tacking banishment onto the criminal sanctions
would be a disproportional response. The call is even easier for the
immigrant with no criminal record whatsoever. Although local police and
local laws can also be decidedly anti-immigrant, 267 the argument that it is
appropriate for local actors to act as normative grand juries in an era of mass
immigration enforcement holds even if not all jurisdictions take up that
responsibility.
Similarly, by shielding their undocumented students or congregation
members from detection by the immigration enforcers, sanctuary campuses
and churches reflect the conscience and ideals of at least a subsection of the
local community. As organizations with community-based service missions,
religious organizations and universities are less constrained by the
institutional incentives and biases that can sometimes hamstring the
decision-making of law enforcement agencies. On the other hand, they are
less directly accountable to the public. Still, neither campuses nor
congregations benefit by alienating their local communities, so their actions
will either largely accord with local views or reflect a calculated decision
that the removal of a particular individual would be sufficiently unjust to
warrant the risk of community friction.

266 This understanding underscores why the loss of the sentencing court remedy of the Judicial
Recommendation Against Deportation (JRAD) was so significant, especially at the moment that
immigration law broadened the deportation net for noncitizens with a criminal history. The JRAD did not
require a technical understanding of immigration law. Rather, sentencing judges needed only a narrative
understanding of individual blameworthiness and mitigation to make a determination that deportation
was not warranted. See generally Philip L. Torrey, The Erosion of Judicial Discretion in Crime-Based
Removal Proceedings, IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS, Feb. 2014, at 1, 4–6 (describing the history and function of
JRADs).
267
See generally Cade, Policing the Immigration Police, supra note 78, (discussing police
departments in North Carolina and Arizona that targeted noncitizens); S. Karthick Ramakrishnan &
Pratheepan Gulasekaram, The Importance of the Political in Immigration Federalism, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1431, 1437 (2012) (“States and localities are increasingly considering and passing laws that create state
immigration crimes, enact state immigration enforcement schemes, regulate the renting of property to
certain noncitizens, penalize businesses for hiring unauthorized workers, and discriminate in the provision
of public services.”); Rodríguez, supra note 185, at 591–600 (describing a typology of state
“restrictionist” measures); Rick Su, The States of Immigration, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1339, 1378–89
(2013) (same). Empirical data suggest that anti-immigrant laws are largely a function of politics rather
than levels of immigration or crime rates. PRATHEEPAN GULASEKARAM & S. KARTHICK
RAMAKRISHNAN, THE NEW IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM 207–08 (2015) (showing that whether a
particular local jurisdiction implements anti-immigrant laws is best predicted by the percentage of local
voters registered as Republican and the presence of an enterprising politician seeking higher office).
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B. Promotion of Procedural Fairness and Legal Accuracy
Other sanctuary measures further legitimacy norms at different stages
of the immigration enforcement process. Churches and cities that provide
legal screening, attorneys, and other resources to help noncitizens defend
against removal proceedings, for example, contribute to legally accurate and
procedurally just outcomes.
The full administration of the immigration laws requires more than
attention to its enforcement provisions. The INA also provides for
immigration benefits 268 and relief from removal. 269 Statutory pathways to
status and defenses to removal are now quite narrow for undocumented
persons inside the United States, as I have explained, but those limitations
make it all the more important that immigration officials take care that those
who are in fact eligible can access the remaining opportunities. 270 Where a
268 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2012) (concerning adjustment of status categories and procedures).
See generally WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42866, PERMANENT LEGAL
IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES: POLICY OVERVIEW (2014) (stating that in FY2013, 65.6% of the
noncitizens who became legal permanent residents did so based on family ties); Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil
Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1965, 75 N.C. L. REV. 274, 297–98 (1996) (discussing how congressional legislation in 1965 made family
reunification a central goal of the INA).
269 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)–(b) (cancellation of removal for LPRs and non-LPRs); id. § 1157
(refugees), id. § 1158 (asylees); id. § 1101(a)(15)(T) (visas for victims of human trafficking); id.
§ 1101(a)(15)(U) (visas for certain crime victims); id. § 1101(a)(15)(S) (visas for certain criminal
informants); id. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (humanitarian parole guidelines); id. § 1254 (temporary protected
status); REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Division B, 119 Stat. 231, 302 (codified as amended
at 49 U.S.C. § 30301) (acknowledging deferred action as an appropriate basis for employment
authorization).
270 Cf. Amanda Frost, Cooperative Enforcement in Immigration Law, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1, 20 (2017)
(suggesting that, as with many other federally regulated fields, immigration officials should proactively
help eligible noncitizens come into compliance with immigration law); Rachel E. Rosenbloom, Remedies
for the Wrongly Deported: Territoriality, Finality, and the Significance of Departure, 33 U. HAW. L. REV.
139, 191 (2010) (“It also bears asking whether the government has a legitimate interest in deporting those
who are not deportable, or in barring from discretionary relief those who are eligible.”); Jason A. Cade &
Mary Honeychurch, Restoring the Statutory Safety-Valve for Immigrant Crime Victims: Premium
Processing for Interim U Visa Benefits, 113 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE (forthcoming 2019) (suggesting that
USCIS undertake an administrative reform that would improve the U visa process for undocumented
victims of serious crime who aid law enforcement). Notably, when noncitizens are able to take advantage
of a statutory means of regularizing their status, past immigration transgressions or violations are erased
and completely forgiven, in stark contrast to the collateral consequences that forever follow a criminal
conviction. See Kari Hong, The Ten Parts of “Illegal” in “Illegal Immigration” That I Do Not
Understand, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 43, 50 (2017) (“Immigration law’s design is to forgive and
forget any violation when remedies are available.”); cf. Margaret Colgate Love, Paying Their Debt to
Society: Forgiveness, Redemption, and the Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act, 54 HOW.
L.J. 753, 755 (2011) (“The status imposed by conviction has become increasingly public, the sanctions
generated by it have become more severe and harder to mitigate, and the number of people trapped in that
status—usually for life—has ballooned.”). In other words, if a person is able to obtain lawful permanent
resident status, they are not penalized for previously having overstayed a visa or worked and lived in the
United States without authorization. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c). Except where the statute sets out
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noncitizen is entitled to relief under asylum law, for example, agents should
help facilitate the claim. 271 Just as importantly, enforcement actions and
policies should be just and fair, especially in a system that now eschews
formal back-end proportionality measures. 272 Seen in this light, the Trump
Administration’s equity-blind enforcement approach does not conform to the
Executive’s proper role. 273 It is an approach that makes the current
immigration scheme less, rather than more, legitimate. 274
Furthermore, the rising use of fast-track mechanisms that bypass
immigration court altogether portends inadequate process on a large scale. 275
The concerns about these “shadow” removals include absence of a neutral
adjudicator, determination of complex immigration issues by nonattorneys,
failure to provide most of the already limited substantive and procedural
rights available in regular immigration proceedings, and inability to seek
judicial review in many cases. 276 Without judicial review, the federal system
lacks the means to correct the errors that inevitably result from such weak
procedural protections.
Procedural deficiencies in removal proceedings—particularly with
respect to fast-track deportation—offend one of the “elementary features of
natural justice,” which is the adjudicatory norm of “offering both sides an

specific bars on the basis of criminal history or immigration violations, Congress did not intend past
infractions to be held against individuals who are nevertheless eligible for status or relief.
271 Matter of S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722, 723, 727 (B.I.A. 1997) (stating that government
enforcement agents “bear the responsibility of ensuring that refugee protection is provided where such
protection is warranted by the circumstances of an asylum applicant’s claim”). Historically, at least,
attorneys for the agency charged with prosecuting removal were trained to support adjudicatory relief
where legally merited. See Cade, supra note 5, at 23 & n.11 (quoting David Martin, former general
counsel to both DHS and the INS).
272 See generally ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 898–
943 (8th ed. 2016) (discussing due process rights, such as representation by adequate counsel (at no
expense to the government), opportunities to present evidence, language-access, reasonable
accommodations for disabilities, and the government’s burdens of proof); Cade, supra note 5, at 22–23
(discussing procedural protections in immigration court); Geoffrey Heeren, Shattering the One-Way
Mirror: Discovery in Immigration Court, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1569, 1575 (2014) (same).
273 See Sohoni, supra note 77, at 49 (arguing that enforcement “crackdowns” can resemble
“lawmaking” more than law enforcing).
274 See, e.g., Reid v. INS, 949 F.2d 287, 288 (9th Cir. 1991) (commending the government’s
immigration prosecutor for conceding error, in light of the principle that “the government has an interest
only in the law being observed, not in victory or defeat in any particular litigation”); LIPSKY, supra note
89, at 15 (arguing that “society seeks not only impartiality from its public agencies but also compassion
for special circumstances and flexibility in dealing with them”).
275 Koh, supra note 25, at 183–84.
276 Id. at 194, 222–31. See generally Amanda Frost, Learning from Our Mistakes: Using Immigration
Enforcement Errors to Guide Reform, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. 769 (2015) (arguing that errors occur in
immigration removal because low-level officials are asked to administer complex and ambiguous
immigration laws rapidly, without sufficient training or oversight).
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opportunity to be heard.” 277 For Professor Jeremy Waldron, rule of law
values include not just settled rules and predictability, but also a true
opportunity for moral deliberation and argumentation. 278 As Professor Tom
Tyler’s work has shown, “[p]eople want to have the opportunity to tell their
side of the story in their own words before decisions are made about how to
handle the dispute or problem.” 279 The Trump Administration’s expansion of
procedurally stunted rapid removal measures thus implicates both legal
accuracy and procedural justice norms, which are particularly important
when something as significant as banishment is on the line.
Sanctuary measures ensuring that noncitizens enjoy the benefit of
counsel help combat these procedural threats. Multiple studies have shown
that attorneys make a critical difference in immigration court outcomes in
the modern system. 280 Represented noncitizens are three to five times more
likely to prevail, according to several of these studies. Attorneys can help
noncitizens hold ICE to its burden of proof, contest the accuracy of charges,
ensure that court appearances are not missed, secure release from detention,
and help establish eligibility for the remaining forms of relief from

277 Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 55–56 (2008). See
generally ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 272, at 946–54 (discussing fast-track removal).
278 Waldron, supra note 277, at 5, 8, 58–59.
279 Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Courts, 44 CT. REV. 26, 30 (2007); see also Bowers,
supra note 79, at 195 (“[T]he idea of ‘voice’ entails an individual’s awareness not only that her reasonable
concerns are going to be considered, but also that her reasonable perspective might be brought to bear to
resolve any ambiguities of law and fact.”).
280 See, e.g., Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration
Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2015) (analyzing 1.2 million deportation cases to demonstrate that only
14% of detained immigrants were able to secure representation and that immigrants with attorneys were
5.5 times more likely to obtain relief from removal); Peter L. Markowitz et al., Accessing Justice: The
Availability and Adequacy of Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 357, 363–64 (2011)
(reporting a study in which only 18% of detained noncitizens with counsel and 3% without counsel were
successful in removal proceedings, in contrast to a win rate of 74% for nondetained (or released)
noncitizens with counsel and 13% without counsel); Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette:
Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 340 (2007) (presenting research suggesting
that asylum seekers represented by counsel were about three times more likely to prevail than those who
were unrepresented); Andrea Saenz, The Power of 1000: Updates from the Nation’s First Immigration
Public Defender, CRIMMIGRATION (July 14, 2015, 4:00 AM), http://crimmigration.com/2015/07/14/thepower-of-1000-updates-from-the-nations-first-immigration-public-defender
[https://perma.cc/K24BCS6P] (“The early data indicate that the presence of NYIFUP counsel increases a detained client’s chance
of success in their removal case ten times over, or by as much as 1000%.”); Representation Makes
Fourteen-Fold Difference in Outcome: Immigration Court “Women with Children” Cases, TRAC
IMMIGRATION (July 15, 2015), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/396 [https://perma.cc/P4TNCS9M] (finding that women and children were more than fourteen times more likely to avoid a
deportation order and be permitted to remain in the country when represented in removal proceedings).
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removal. 281 Similarly, when sanctuaries help noncitizens subject to summary
procedures assert their claims with the help of legal representation—or avoid
apprehension altogether—they help counter the consequences of fast-track
mechanisms operating with a high probability of error.
C. Last-Resort Circuit-Breakers
Finally, religious congregations offering shelter to noncitizens facing
impending removal can act as a last-resort “circuitbreaker in the State’s
machinery of” injustice, to paraphrase the Supreme Court. 282 By providing
shelter and negotiation on behalf of those for whom formal processes have
expired, but who nevertheless have compelling legal or equitable claims,
church sanctuaries disconnect, at least temporarily, the wiring of the
deportation machine.
Notably, in a number of cases covered by the media, this kind of
sanctuary activity has eventually jolted federal authorities into doing the
right thing. 283 Jeanette Vizguerra’s case, with which I began this Article,
provides an example. To be sure, Vizguerra’s removal was authorized under
law, although it was not legally required. She had (and continues to have) a
pending path to lawful status on the basis of having been a serious crime
victim who assisted law enforcement, among other factors. Although there
is a lengthy backlog in the adjudication of U applications due to the annual
statutory cap of 10,000, the agency is authorized to conditionally approve
281 See generally Elizabeth Keyes, Zealous Advocacy: Pushing Against the Borders in Immigration
Litigation, 45 SETON HALL L. REV. 475 (2015) (discussing the impact of zealous representation in
immigration court and calling upon the immigration bar to establish norms of zealous advocacy).
282 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306–07 (2004).
283 See also Mary O’Leary, Undocumented Immigrant Who Took Sanctuary in New Haven Church
Granted Stay of Deportation, NEW HAVEN REG. (July 26, 2017, 5:36 PM),
https://www.nhregister.com/connecticut/article/Undocumented-immigrant-who-took-sanctuary-in-New11729234.php [https://perma.cc/8L7D-VQY5] (describing how a church decision to offer sanctuary to a
woman living in the United States for twenty-four years resulted in an immigration judge granting a stay);
Carolina Pichardo, Guatemalan Immigrant Who Took Refuge at Church Granted Stay of Deportation,
DNA INFO (Aug. 22, 2017, 6:46 PM), https://www.dnainfo.com/new-york/20170822/washingtonheights/amanda-morales-guerra-guatemala-refugee-deportation [https://perma.cc/CJ43-AQGC] (“The
undocumented Guatemalan immigrant with three young kids who last week took refuge at a church on
West 179th Street to avoid deportation has been granted a temporary reprieve in her quest to remain in
the country, officials said.”); Mother from Peru Granted Stay from Deportation, BUS. INSIDER (May 21,
2017, 3:48 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/ap-mother-from-peru-granted-stay-from-deportation2017-5 [https://perma.cc/AE4W-2GGM] (“A mother of two children who sought sanctuary at a Quaker
meeting house in Denver to avoid U.S. immigration authorities has been granted a temporary stay from
deportation.”); Woman Who Took Sanctuary in Church Gets One-Year Reprieve, BOS. 25 NEWS (June
11, 2018, 2:28 PM), https://www.boston25news.com/news/massachusetts/woman-who-took-churchsanctuary-granted-stay-of-deportation/767552821 [https://perma.cc/E9JC-X5RZ] (“A woman who took
sanctuary in a Massachusetts church to avoid deportation to her native Peru has been granted a one-year
stay of removal by federal immigration officials.”).
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any “bona fide” applicant and grant deferred action and work authorization
in the interim. 284 Moreover, the backlog itself has resulted in part from the
agency’s failure to issue implementing regulations for more than seven years
after Congress first created the U visa. 285 Thus, the federal government’s
failure to devote adequate resources to this form of relief is in large part the
reason that Vizguerra and tens of thousands of other U applicants continue
to be present without authorization. Accordingly, the efforts of Vizguerra’s
church, which eventually resulted in a stay of removal until her U visa could
be adjudicated, arguably led to a more legally accurate outcome.
But deportation is also normatively unjustifiable in Vizguerra’s case
because of the tremendous equities in her favor and the hardship that
deportation would cause to her and her family. By breaking the circuit in the
deportation machinery and allowing negotiations to continue on Vizguerra’s
behalf, her unjust removal from the country was averted. 286
D. Spheres of Protected Autonomy
Sanctuaries also promote other legitimizing norms worthy of
consideration. One way they do so is by enabling protected autonomy. They
help guard against unlawful intrusions on the daily lives and lawful activities
of persons suspected to be deportable (which, of course, sometimes includes
U.S. citizens 287). It is beyond the scope of this Article to explore the
constitutional rights of noncitizens in detail, but a few highlights will help
illustrate the role that sanctuaries can play in protecting against illegitimate
incursions on spheres of autonomy.
The fact that a person is (or might be) removable from the United States
on the basis of civil immigration violations or criminal history does not
extinguish the person’s constitutional right to be free of unreasonable
284

Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 214(p)(6), 122 Stat. 5044, 5053 (2008)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(6) (2012)) (“The Secretary may grant work authorization to
any alien who has a pending, bona fide application for nonimmigrant status under section
101(a)(15)(U).”); 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(d)(1)–(2) (2018). See generally Cade & Honeychurch, supra note
270.
285 Leticia M. Saucedo, A New “U”: Organizing Victims and Protecting Immigrant Workers, 42 U.
RICH. L. REV. 891, 912 (2008).
286 Cf. Pichardo, supra note 283 (“‘Amanda is not hiding. Amanda is taking sanctuary and is seeking
the justice that has been denied,’ Juan Carlos Ruiz, a Lutheran minister and organizer for the Sanctuary
Coalition, said Monday.”).
287 Paige St. John & Joel Rubin, ICE Held an American Man in Custody For 1,273 Days. He’s Not
the Only One Who Had to Prove His Citizenship, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2018, 5:00 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-citizens-ice-20180427-htmlstory.html
[https://perma.cc/
J64N-SY7A] (“But Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents repeatedly target U.S. citizens for
deportation by mistake, making wrongful arrests based on incomplete government records, bad data and
lax investigations, according to a Times review of federal lawsuits, internal ICE documents and
interviews.”).
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searches and seizures or to engage in other lawful life activities. One of the
most important, but largely overlooked, takeaways from Arizona v. United
States is what that decision revealed about the Supreme Court’s view that
even deportable noncitizens should be able to engage in lawful daily life
activities without fear of unlawful government intrusion in furtherance of
immigration enforcement. 288 Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the majority
emphasized the “significant complexities” of federal immigration law and
the “immediate human concerns” raised by factors such as “[u]nauthorized
workers trying to support their families.” 289 Throughout its opinion, the Court
reiterated the principle that noncitizens who are not removal priorities under
the federal government’s enforcement policies should not be subjected to
“unnecessary harassment” by state or local officers. 290
Most revealing on this particular point was the Court’s analysis of the
single challenged state provision to survive preemption—a show-me-yourpapers law allowing state officers to make a reasonable attempt to determine
the immigration status of persons who have been stopped on some other
legitimate basis if the officer reasonably suspects the person might be
unlawfully present. 291 The Court made clear the Fourth Amendment governs
these encounters and that such encounters cannot be initiated or prolonged
in ways that violate the Constitution, regardless of the individual’s
underlying immigration status. 292 As the Court stated, “it is not a crime for a
removable alien to remain present in the United States. If the police stop
someone based on nothing more than possible removability, the usual
predicate for an arrest is absent.” 293
Similarly, in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, the Court recognized noncitizens’
legitimate expectation to be free of Fourth Amendment violations by federal
immigration agents, even going so far as to require immigration judges and
federal courts to ignore evidence of an immigrant’s removability where it
was obtained through enforcement practices resulting in either egregious or

288

567 U.S. 387, 406–09 (2012). That case concerned an omnibus law authorizing or requiring state
actors to engage in various immigration enforcement activities, which the Court largely struck down on
preemption grounds. Id. at 393–94, 403, 407, 410. See generally Cade, Judging Immigration Equity,
supra note 31, at 1042–49 (discussing the Arizona decision).
289 Arizona, 567 U.S. at 396, 409.
290 Id. at 408; see also id. at 402, 407, 410.
291 Id. at 411–15.
292 Id. at 411, 413–14 (citation omitted); see also Cade, Policing the Immigration Police, supra note
78, at 189–90 (discussing this aspect of Arizona); Michael Kagan, Immigration Law’s Looming Fourth
Amendment Problem, 104 GEO. L. J. 125 (2015) (applying Fourth Amendment law to the immigration
arrest and detainer context).
293 Arizona, 567 U.S. at 407 (citation omitted).
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widespread violations of the Fourth Amendment. 294 Subsequently, numerous
lower federal courts have elaborated on this holding. 295
The freedom of noncitizens—even those present in the United States
without authorization—to lawfully engage in civic and community life
emanates from other precedential touchstones, too. In Plyler v. Doe, for
example, the Court found that parents have a constitutionally protected right
to send their undocumented children to public school. 296 Similarly, the Court
has limited the authority of states to deny, on the basis of immigration status
alone, access to other services for which noncitizens are otherwise eligible.297
Finally, federal law does not directly prohibit undocumented noncitizens
from working and expressly authorizes work as an independent contractor or
business owner. 298
Thus, when immigration agents (or their subfederal deputies) conduct
home raids and workplace raids that do not adhere to the constraints of the
Fourth Amendment or engage in enforcement activities in hospitals,
courthouses, and other places where noncitizens are engaging in or assisting
with vital community services, these constitutionally protected areas of
autonomy are threatened. 299 The problem is magnified in areas where local
294

468 U.S. 1032, 1050–51 (1984); see also Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention?
Immigration Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563,
1624–27 (2010) (same); Elias, supra note 174, at 1115 (discussing this aspect of Lopez-Mendoza and
arguing that Fourth Amendment violations have now become widespread in immigration enforcement);
Kagan, supra note 292, at 147 n.159; see also Cade, Policing the Immigration Police, supra note 78, at
183 (arguing that Executive Branch officials are constitutionally obligated to uphold the Fourth
Amendment even where the violation is not per se egregious).
295 See, e.g., Yanez-Marquez v. Lynch, 789 F.3d 434, 450 (4th Cir. 2015); Oliva-Ramos v. Attorney
Gen., 694 F.3d 259, 271–72 (3d Cir. 2012); Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 70 (1st Cir. 2006);
Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 2006).
296 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982).
297 See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (holding that states have “no ‘special
public interest’” in limiting to citizens the expenditure of tax revenues to which aliens had contributed);
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 43 (1915) (holding that Arizona could not restrict the employment of aliens);
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (holding that discrimination on the basis of immigration
status in the application of criminal ordinances violates equal protection).
298 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(3)(A) (2012) (prohibiting employers from hiring workers without federal
authorization, but not prohibiting unauthorized work itself); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.1(f) (specifying that federal
law does not prohibit unauthorized work if done as an independent contractor or business owner). See
generally Geoffrey Heeren, The Immigrant Right to Work, 31 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 243 (2017) (providing
a historical overview of unauthorized noncitizens’ right to work in this country); Jennifer J. Lee,
Redefining the Legality of Undocumented Work, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1617 (2018) (explaining the current
legal landscape regarding unauthorized noncitizens’ right to work).
299 See, e.g., Adolfo Flores & Chris Geidner, A DREAMer Was Arrested During a Raid and Now
Immigration Officials Have Been Ordered to Explain Why, BUZZFEED NEWS (published Feb. 14, 2017,
8:43 PM; updated Feb. 15, 2017, 7:33 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/adolfoflores/
immigrations-officials-ordered-to-defend-arrest-of-dreamer [https://perma.cc/6E82-X7UH]; Michael
Matza, After ICE Raid at Chesco Mushroom Farm, Anxiety High Among Immigrant Workers, PHILA.
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law enforcement and other authorities work in tandem to turn arrests and
civic encounters into removal actions wherever possible. 300
Measures limiting local roles in immigration policing guard against
these incursions. By providing an equitable screen that limits the access and
information of federal enforcers, these policies enable noncitizens and their
families to operate within autonomous spaces with less fear of
unconstitutional (and therefore illegitimate) interference. Within the
boundaries governed by the particular sanctuary measures, at least,
noncitizens can operate with certain expectations regarding enforcement
such that, for the most part, they can continue to engage in the life and
institutions of the community. 301 This relative predictability facilitates the
human flourishing that underlies the basis for the protection of various
autonomy interests. 302
Sanctuaries ward against rights violations for U.S. citizens and lawful
permanent residents (LPRs), too, especially those who do not have white
European ancestry. 303 As a consequence of show-me-your-papers laws, local
immigration force multipliers, and race-based immigration stops, even
INQUIRER (May 7, 2017, 7:00 AM), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/ice-raid-mushroom-fear-deportchester-county.html [https://perma.cc/7HGZ-W3VR]; Lisa Rein et al., Federal Agents Conduct
Immigration Enforcement Raids in at Least Six States, WASH. POST (Feb. 11, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/federal-agents-conduct-sweeping-immigration-enforcementraids-in-at-least-6-states/2017/02/10/4b9f443a-efc8-11e6-b4ff-ac2cf509efe5_story.html
[https://perma.cc/55HA-XF7S]; Andrew Selsky, Activist: Immigration Officers Detain 10 Workers in
Oregon, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 1, 2017), https://apnews.com/88fd12ab02124e17968a8068bc85a3dd
[https://perma.cc/T3PE-TWPF]; David Wickert, Georgia Immigration Arrests Spark Sharp Responses,
ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Feb. 11, 2017), https://www.ajc.com/news/local/georgia-immigration-arrestsspark-sharp-responses/Vy6VksCEdGkgctSQwKB14L [https://perma.cc/MS8T-9VJ7]; see also supra
note 163 (citing media reports of enforcement actions in courthouses and hospitals).
300 See supra notes 170–74, 195–98, 291–93 and accompanying text (discussing joint federal–state
enforcement efforts and correlations between an amplified local role in immigration policing and
constitutional rights violations).
301 Cf. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, supra note 60, at 2039 (“[W]hen prosecutors have enormous
discretionary power, giving other decisionmakers discretion promotes consistency, not arbitrariness.
Discretion limits discretion; institutional competition curbs excess and abuse.”).
302 Bowers, supra note 79, at 144 (arguing that the ability to “plan[] affairs” without state interference
is “a tool for self-discovery and expression” and emphasizing that “to know what the state may not do is
to know not only what I may do but also to ponder and pursue who I am and what I may become”); see
also JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 369 (1986) (“The ideal of personal autonomy is the vision
of people controlling, to some degree, their own destiny, fashioning it through successive decisions
throughout their lives.”); Bezdek, supra note 22, at 917 n.54 (explaining that “liberation theologians hold
as a central tenet the right and capacity of the common people to become active, creative agents of their
own history”); Christopher Heath Wellman, Toward a Liberal Theory of Political Obligation, 111 ETHICS
735, 738 (2001) (arguing that liberty from state intrusion “implies that each autonomous individual has a
right to decide which self-regarding benefits to pursue”).
303 See Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A “Magic
Mirror” into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111, 1114 (1998) (arguing that our treatment of
noncitizens affords a window into current racial attitudes more broadly).
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citizens and LPRs—if they appear Latino—are less able to make plans,
engage with community institutions, or otherwise carry out their lives
because of the constant specter of state intrusion on suspicion of unlawful
presence. Stops based solely on race-based suspicion of unlawful presence
offend bedrock principles of legality and liberty. 304 In Professor Herbert
Packer’s words: “It is important, especially in a society that likes to describe
itself as ‘free’ and ‘open,’ that a government should be empowered to coerce
people only for what they do and not for what they are.” 305 Decoupling
immigration from local law enforcement thus can help avoid racial profiling
and other distortions that arise from the integration of the two systems. 306 In
this way, sanctuaries protect not just the legitimate expectations of
undocumented residents but also those with citizenship or lawful status.
The efficacy of cooperation-limiting policies in protecting against
incursions on spheres of autonomy is enhanced where sanctuary jurisdictions
also have implemented various integrative measures. Some jurisdictions, for
example, have facilitated noncitizen residents’ access to community life by
making available driver’s licenses and identity cards. Twelve states and the
District of Columbia allow all residents who meet the requirements to obtain
driver’s licenses, even those who are unauthorized. 307 Because of restrictions

304 HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 98 (1968) (arguing that arrests
“for investigation” or “on suspicion” offend the principle of legality, even where the individual is held
“only for a few minutes”).
305 Id. at 74 (emphasis added).
306 See, e.g., Edgar Aguilasocho et al., Misplaced Priorities: The Failure of Secure Communities in
Los Angeles County, IMMIGRANT RTS. CLINIC, U.C. IRVINE SCH. L. 16–18 (2012),
http://www.law.uci.edu/academics/real-life-learning/clinics/MisplacedPrioritiesaguilasocho-rodwinashar.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7QZ-2G79] (noting increased racial profiling in policing in Los Angeles
County following the implementation of the Secure Communities program); Amanda Armenta, Between
Public Service and Social Control: Policing Dilemmas in the Era of Immigration Enforcement, 63 SOC.
PROBS. 111, 121 (2016) (showing with two years’ worth of data that the 287(g) program implemented in
Nashville, Tennessee led to significant racial profiling and public trust concerns); Michael Coon, Local
Immigration Enforcement and Arrests of the Hispanic Population, 5 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SECURITY
645, 646 (2017) (finding that a 287(g) program in Frederick County, Maryland led to a “significantly
higher number of arrests of Hispanics by the Sheriff’s Office than would have occurred in its absence”);
Trevor Gardner II & Aarti Kohli, The C.A.P. Effect: Racial Profiling in the ICE Criminal Alien Program,
CHIEF JUST. EARL WARREN INST. ON RACE, ETHNICITY & DIVERSITY 1 (2009),
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/policybrief_irving_0909_v9.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BLG9-NF3Y]
(“[I]mmediately after Irving, Texas law enforcement had 24-hour access . . . to ICE in the local jail,
discretionary arrests of Hispanics for petty offenses—particularly minor traffic offenses—rose
dramatically.”); Cade, supra note 47, at 1796–1811 (describing distortions in immigration law and
criminal law that arise through the convergence of the two systems).
307 Adam Hunter & Angelo Mathay, Driver’s Licenses for Unauthorized Immigrants: 2016
Highlights, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (Nov. 22, 2016), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/articles/2016/11/22/drivers-licenses-for-unauthorized-immigrants-2016-highlights
[https://
perma.cc/R6DN-AEZ7].
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posed by the federal REAL ID Act of 2005, 308 the licenses that most of these
states issue to undocumented noncitizens are visibly distinguishable and
limited to state or local use.309 Nevertheless, when undocumented
noncitizens are able to obtain driver’s licenses, it can have a “transformative
effect . . . , enabling them to drive without fear of being stopped by state or
local police, arrested, detained, or fined, and thereby facilitating their daily
access to work, friends, and family.” 310 The related provision of municipal
identity cards to unauthorized noncitizens increases access to local services
such as police assistance, school enrollment, libraries, parking, bank and
pharmacy accounts, and other community benefits. 311 In turn, engagement
with these institutions can help noncitizens develop ties, equities, and
evidence that eventually may be valued by formal immigration law.312
E. Narratives and Norms
Finally, sanctuaries provide an important voice in the contest of
narratives about noncitizens and their place in this country. In the view
expressed (or at least implied) by some sanctuary entities, a mass,
indiscriminate approach to immigration enforcement harms our shared
humanity. Some feel that to ignore or accommodate this approach is to

308 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 202(c)(2), 109 Stat. 231, 312–13 (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. § 30301 (2012)) (prohibiting the provision of regular driver’s licenses to
undocumented individuals and imposing restrictions on licenses for nonimmigrant visa holders but
allowing standard licenses for recipients of deferred action).
309 Elias, supra note 185, at 835–36 (describing the differences in license design in the states that
allow unauthorized or conditionally present noncitizens to obtain driver’s licenses).
310 Id. at 837; Hiroshi Motomura, Arguing About Sanctuary, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 435, 440 (2018)
(“A driver’s license also greatly reduces the likelihood that a routine traffic stop will trigger an
immigration status check and possible arrest, detention, and removal — thus a license represents nonenforcement.”); see also SAMEER M. ASHAR ET AL., UNIV. OF CAL. IRVINE SCH. OF LAW, LEGAL STUDIES
RESEARCH PAPER SERIES NO. 2016-05, NAVIGATING LIMINAL LEGALITIES ALONG PATHWAYS TO
CITIZENSHIP: IMMIGRANT VULNERABILITY AND THE ROLE OF MEDIATING INSTITUTIONS 34 (2015) (“All
residents of Southern California must contend with urban sprawl, but the effects of geographic distance
were exacerbated by the inability of many undocumented residents to obtain a driver’s license. As
mentioned previously, A.B. 60, enables undocumented immigrants to secure California driver’s licenses,
and a large number of our constituent interviewees gave unprompted and unequivocal statements about
the importance of these licenses in their daily lives.”); Campbell, supra note 189, at 114 (explaining that
in some locations the lack of a driver’s license also frequently leads to the impoundment of immigrants’
cars).
311 Elias, supra note 185, at 840–41; Campbell, supra note 189, at 114–15.
312 See, e.g., MOTOMURA, supra note 67, at 111 (“[A]ffiliation arguments grow in strength as
unauthorized migrants develop ties and make contributions to American society over time.”); Stumpf,
supra note 141, at 1712–20 (discussing various ways that time is valued in immigration law).
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condone it. 313 For others, public safety concerns motivate sanctuary efforts.314
To be sure, there may be a gap between a sanctuary entity’s real and publicly
expressed motivations, possibly for strategic reasons. But at the end of the
day, the underlying impetus is less important than the overall effect. All
sanctuaries, by visibly resisting the Trump Administration’s approach in
principled and transparent ways, promote competing norms of justice and
empathy in the national dialogue. 315
The legitimacy problem created by the failure to implement equitable
discretion at the federal level is magnified in jurisdictions where local
enforcers seek to cooperate with (or even expand on) federal immigration
enforcement priorities. Lack of institutional competition expands the
possibility of arbitrariness, excess, and abuse. Defensive sanctuary policies,
on the other hand, constrain federal excess and capriciousness. Thus,
recognizing the discretion possessed by subfederal actors in this context
helps counteract immigration law’s growing legitimacy problem.
“Discretion limits discretion.” 316 Moreover, as noted, local actors are at least
as well-situated to make equitable judgments about persons in their
community as are detached and geographically distant federal enforcers.317
Cities, churches, and campuses engaging in sanctuary activities have a
particular gravitas that lends weight to their dissent.318 Their integral roles in
313

(2006).

BILL ONG HING, DEPORTING OUR SOULS: VALUES, MORALITY, AND IMMIGRATION POLICY 50

314 See supra notes 189–93 and accompanying text (explaining the public safety rationale for
sanctuary city policies and citing examples).
315 See Bezdek, supra note 22, at 913 (“The commitment of the State to its law is indicated by the
narratives it chooses, but the law of refugees, and the law of citizen conscience unfettered by the
government’s preferences, are also parts of the construction of legal meaning.”); see also ROBERT COVER,
Nomos and Narrative, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW 95, 98–99 (Martha Minow et al. eds.,
1992) (“The normative universe is held together by the force of interpretive commitments—some small
and private, others immense and public. These commitments—of officials and of others—do determine
what law means and what law shall be.”).
316 Stuntz, Unequal Justice, supra note 60, at 2039.
317 See also Cade, supra note 205, at 385–405 (making similar arguments about state-level pardons
for deportable noncitizens); Cade, Return of the JRAD, supra note 32, at 50 (making similar arguments
about criminal court JRADs, deferred adjudication, and expungements). To be sure, this claim holds most
true with respect to macro-level policy decisions by distant technocrats. But as the current Administration
has tightly constrained the ability of local ICE field officers to defer enforcement on equitable grounds,
it matters little how well-aligned that local officer might be with the norms of her community. See, e.g.,
Minutes for AILA/ICE Liaison Meeting on October 26, 2017, supra note 158, at 2 (“On a case-by-case
basis in extraordinary circumstances, the Chief Counsel may – with the concurrence of the NTA issuing
agency (i.e. USCIS, CBP, ICE ERO or ICE HSI) – agree to administratively close or dismiss a case.”).
318 Villazor & Gulasekaram, supra note 44, at 49 (“These institutions have missions that are meant
to serve their immediate community, but are also tied to broader responsibilities to the nation, the world,
and to notions of social justice. . . . For universities, that gravitas comes from long-established reputations
as research and policy centers with expertise in the field; for churches, it is the moral heft of serving
vulnerable populations.”).
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the community, as well as the various legal protections they are afforded,
allow them the independence to assert contrasting views, thereby
communicating “powerful reminders to community members that antisanctuary views are not consensus perspectives.” 319 For law enforcement
agencies in particular, the fact that they have the authority to help the federal
government enforce immigration law, but choose not to, endows their
competing narrative with special clout.
Conceptualized this way, sanctuary efforts should be viewed not as the
“demonstrative acts” of civil disobedience but rather as initiatives that both
implement a more just conception of law and actively reshape norms in a
longer conversation about immigration policy. 320 The resonance of sanctuary
efforts emanates from a sustained alternative interpretation of federal law.321
In Professors Villazor and Gulasekaram’s words, sanctuaries are
“stakeholders in the project of immigration regulation,” whose policies
“function as negotiations and contestations with the federal government’s
current enforcement regime.” 322 Law consists of more than rules on paper.323
Narratives give the law its meaning, and our shared understandings of right
and wrong are contingent and dependent upon the creative activities of the
stakeholders interpreting the law. 324 If sanctuaries continue to sustain
alternative interpretive efforts, and if the stories of the sympathetic
individuals and families they helped continue to be shared, the significance

319

Id. (“Moreover, these institutions can couple this heft with the ability – either because of how
they finance themselves or their constitutional protections – to stand apart from the majoritarian politics
of their municipality or state. . . . Their reputations in the community enable them to question and
undermine the legitimacy and desirability of the state’s hard sanctions.”).
320 Bezdek, supra note 22, at 973 (making this observation about earlier sanctuary movements);
Villazor & Gulasekaram, supra note 44, at 52 (explaining that sanctuaries can “serve the critical
governance functions of norm-creation and swaying public perception”).
321 See also Villazor & Gulasekaram, supra note 44, at 56 (“What mostly links these multi-faceted
sanctuaries – from states to localities and agencies to schools to churches – is not their claim to be the
final decisionmaker over a jurisdiction, but rather that all of them are registering dissent against the
current federal administration’s immigration policy.”).
322 Id. at 33; see also Bezdek, supra note 22, at 971 (describing the 1980s Sanctuary “Movement as
a heroic epic, challenging entrenched policies and policymakers with a contrary normative understanding,
and enabling citizens to insist on changing those policies of exclusion”).
323 Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Forward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 4–5 (1983) (“Once understood in the context of the narratives that give it meaning, law
becomes not merely a system of rules to be observed, but a world in which we live.”).
324 Id. at 4 (“We constantly create and maintain a world of right and wrong, of lawful and unlawful,
of valid and void.”); see also Susan L. Waysdorf, Popular Tribunals, Legal Storytelling, and the Pursuit
of a Just Law, 2 YALE J.L. & LIBERATION 67, 68 (1991) (arguing that “legal storytelling can provide the
nexus between justice-seeking values and the narrative form, within the context of more traditional legal
discourse”).
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of the movement will transcend equitable results in individual cases,
ultimately shaping and refining underlying norms and policies. 325
Finally, sanctuaries may further legitimacy norms by counteracting a
growing distrust regarding the ability of the immigration enforcement system
to achieve just results. As Professor Emily Ryo has shown, the experiences
of long-term immigrant detainees are leading them to develop and
disseminate legal cynicism about the legitimacy of the deportation system
on a widespread basis.326 Those most affected by the system perceive the
“law in action” to be punitive, inscrutable, and arbitrary. 327 This cynicism is
problematic for numerous reasons, not the least of which is that it leads
individuals to opt out of the legal system altogether, even those with
meritorious claims. 328 To the extent that sanctuary activities inject some
modicum of fairness and equity into the federal removal system and its
subfederal criminal law adjuncts, they work against this growing legal
cynicism, at least on a local level.
*

*

*

When federal enforcers neglect to implement immigration law
equitably, such concerns devolve further upstream in the removal process.
As this Part has explained, the local officials and institutions that interact
with noncitizens before they come into the hands of ICE have the opportunity
to engage in measures that provide temporary or permanent relief in
multifaceted ways. Some of these efforts prescreen noncitizens, albeit in
roughshod fashion, relying on local norms and context to determine whom,
if anyone, to subject to immigration enforcement. Others promote procedural
and legal accuracy. Still others break the enforcement circuit when there
appear to be no other legal options to permit necessary reconsideration.
Further, sanctuary efforts help enable constitutionally protected autonomy,
for noncitizens and citizens alike. And finally, these efforts help shape the
narratives about immigrants and immigration law, both locally and on the
325

Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Towards a Demosprudence of Law and
Social Movements, 123 YALE L.J. 2740, 2749–51, 2759–60 (2014) (describing a collective action
mechanism they call “demosprudence” through which “mobilized constituencies, often at the local level,
challenge basic constitutive understandings of justice in our democracy”).
326 See Ryo, supra note 42.
327 Id. at 1003, 1024–48.
328 Id. at 1049; see also id. at 1050–51 (explaining that legal systems that create cynicism impart
antisocial and anti-rule of law policy messages which can be diffused to wider circles than the affected
individual). To be sure, this cynicism may in fact be an intentional aspect of the design of President
Trump’s policies; it may be hoped to be a deterrent for those contemplating illegal (and possibly legal)
migration.
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national stage, in ways that ultimately may result in more fairness and
proportionality on a macro level.
V. SANCTUARY-BASED EQUITY’S LIMITATIONS AND DRAWBACKS
Sanctuaries are no panacea to the problems of the removal system.
There are limitations to the manner in which sanctuaries can adjust the
intensity of federal enforcement. First, and most obviously, sanctuaries will
only be effective where they operate. Accordingly, the protections provided
by sanctuary measures for individuals will be inconsistent from place to
place and nonexistent in many locations. Second, these measures are
controversial, resulting in political pressures and attempts to restrict federal
law enforcement grants to sanctuary cities, often generating costly
litigation. 329 Third, the Trump Administration has demonstrated a propensity
to seek revenge on some sanctuary jurisdictions, surging enforcement
resources in such areas on at least a sporadic basis, and thus potentially
overriding the ability of sanctuaries to protect residents of their
communities. 330
Additionally, it must be acknowledged that in many cases, sanctuaries
are unable to evaluate the normative justifiability of removability with
precision. (Resource-intensive sanctuary activities by religious organizations
may present an exception to this general rule, however.) Police, prosecutors,
and other subfederal officials must generally rely on incomplete information,
proxies, and guidelines as they make decisions or implement policies that
will protect individuals or categories of immigrants. For example, many
police departments and municipalities with sanctuary policies have set
noncooperation as the default rule, providing for exceptions only where the
noncitizen has a significant criminal history. On one hand, those carve-outs
help justify the view that sanctuary entities operate as an equitable grand jury
because they will in fact turn an arrestee over to ICE where the equities are
329

See, e.g., County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497 (N.D. Cal. 2017); Enhancing
Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799 (Jan. 30,
2017) (expressing ire against sanctuary cities and a plan to withhold federal funds from them).
330 See Statement from ICE Acting Director Tom Homan on California Sanctuary Law, ICE (Oct. 6,
2017),
https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/statement-ice-acting-director-tom-homan-californiasanctuary-law [https://perma.cc/32GA-WGZW] (stating that as a consequence of California’s sanctuary
policies, “ICE will have no choice but to conduct at-large arrests in local neighborhoods and at worksites,
which will inevitably result in additional collateral arrests”); Bernal, supra note 19; Victor Fiorillo, ICE
Arrests 107 Immigrants in Philly This Week During “Operation Safe City,” PHIL. MAG. (Sept. 29, 2017,
8:00 AM), https://www.phillymag.com/news/2017/09/29/ice-arrests-107-immigrants-philly-operationsafe-city [https://perma.cc/LGS7-UPXP]; Rick Ritter, ICE Arrest Hundreds During Operation ‘Safe City’
Immigration Crackdown; 28 Arrested in Md., CBS BALT. (Sept. 29, 2017, 6:13 PM),
https://baltimore.cbslocal.com/2017/09/29/immigration-baltimore-ice-operation-safe-city-maryland
[https://perma.cc/P58P-SFCG].
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less obviously sympathetic. For many observers, fewer normative concerns
are raised when police cooperate with federal authorities regarding the
removal of noncitizens with serious criminal records. On occasion, however,
these inexact law enforcement methods will expose noncitizens who some
would believe continue to deserve a reprieve or, conversely, aid noncitizens
who some would believe are undeserving of protection. Thus, the roughshod
approach is not ideal, but such is the world we live in when formal code law
is too harsh and static and federal enforcers decline to employ equitable
discretion.
There are at least three additional reasons why these downsides are
outweighed by the positive functions of sanctuaries. First, unlike jury
nullification or grand jury refusal to indict in criminal law, sanctuary
measures do not offer a final veto over federal enforcement decisions. If the
federal government is determined, in many cases it will eventually be able
to apprehend the noncitizen and put him or her into removal proceedings. 331
Second, sanctuary efforts largely maintain the status quo. Immigration
crackdowns and equity-blind enforcement, in contrast, generate significant
and costly external consequences, including (1) the cost of detention and
removal proceedings; (2) destruction of family units with long-term effects
on the health of children and collateral consequences for foster care and
welfare systems; (3) trepidation about accessing preventative medical care,
resulting in the unnecessary spread of treatable disease and burdens for
hospital emergency rooms; (4) loss of workforce; and (5) failure to report
crime. And for much of this, taxpayers end up footing the bill. 332
Third, when the consequences of an enforcement system are as severe
as those that result from deportation, the balance should tip toward risk of
underenforcement, with the heavier burden rightly placed on the

331

See, e.g., Ed Pilkington, U.S. Deports Mother Who Took Sanctuary, GUARDIAN (Aug. 21, 2007,
3:59 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/aug/21/usa.edpilkington [https://perma.cc/24WUFKAY] (reporting on Elvira Arellano, an activist with a U.S. citizen son, who was eventually apprehended
and deported despite taking church sanctuary in Chicago, Illinois for a year).
332 See, e.g., Jana Kasperkevic, Deporting All of America’s Illegal Immigrants Would Cost a
BUS.
INSIDER
(Jan.
30,
2012,
10:00
AM),
Whopping
$285
Billion,
http://www.businessinsider.com/deporting-all-of-americas-illegal-immigrants-would-cost-a-whopping285-billion-2012-1 [https://perma.cc/LAY2-LHL5] (citing sources establishing that deporting one
noncitizen likely costs the government between $12,500 and $23,480); The New York Immigrant Family
Unity Project: Good for Families, Good for Employers, and Good for All New Yorkers, CENTER FOR
POPULAR
DEMOCRACY
ET
AL.
5,
10–14,
https://populardemocracy.org/sites/default/files/immgrant_family_unity_project_print_layout.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ED6S-PW3F] (estimating that if noncitizens in immigration detention in New York
were provided legal representation, the state could save nearly $2 million annually through reduced
spending on health insurance, foster care services, and lost tax revenue, while employers would save $4
million annually by avoiding employee turnover costs).
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government. 333 Sanctuary entities that decline to assist federal agents in the
machinery of removal fit within theories of federalism that posit subfederal
actors as checks against federal tyranny and abuse. 334 Increasingly, theorists
have applied federalism insights to nongovernmental institutions. 335 While
sanctuary policies that run counter to federal enforcement priorities may
sometimes be overprotective, a system that errs on the side of liberty is
preferable to one that risks oppression. 336
The dynamics between sanctuaries and the federal government are
messy, and one should hold no delusion that sanctuaries will precipitate
consistent justice by any means. But even beyond the short-term individual
gains that sanctuaries will sometimes achieve, they also play an important
role in influencing the national dialogue on immigration enforcement policy
and ultimately may help shape both legislative and judicial activity in this
area. In the best-case scenario, sanctuaries would help achieve laws and
enforcement policies that reflect a more humane, family-protective, and
inclusive vision of which noncitizens should have a right to remain in the
country.
CONCLUSION
A system administering sanctions with consequences for human life as
significant as banishment and the destruction of family integrity requires
sufficient play in the joints to account for the particulars of individual cases.
When Congress excised back-end equitable adjudicatory measures from the
purview of immigration judges and created mechanisms to process certain
categories of noncitizens through summary procedures lacking basic
procedural protections, the responsibility for equitable sorting shifted
forward to Executive Branch enforcers. To faithfully execute this scheme
333 Matt Matravers, Unreliability, Innocence, and Preventive Detention, in CRIMINAL LAW
CONVERSATIONS 81, 82 (Paul H. Robinson et al. eds., 2009) (arguing that “a situation in which someone
is overburdened is worse from the point of view of justice than one in which someone carries a burden
that is too light. It is worse, still, for someone for whom no burden is appropriate and yet a burden is
applied”).
334 See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (“[A] healthy balance of power between
the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.”).
335 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Overseeing Agency Enforcement, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1129,
1146–47 (2016) (arguing that citizen oversight models can curb political pressures to overenforce);
Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down,
124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 24–44 (2010) (applying federalism principles to argue that agencies and other
public institutions can play a valuable role in dissenting against federal policies); Villazor &
Gulasekaram, supra note 44, at 51–53 (extending federalism analysis to include private organizations).
336 Peter Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy: Reflections on Government Appeals of
Criminal Sentences, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1001, 1018 (1980) (“[I]t is ultimately better to err in favor of
nullification than against it.”).
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demands fidelity to an individual evaluation of humanity and not simply rote
adherence to blackletter rules. At the end of the day, a normatively wrong
removal is nearly as troubling as one unsupported by code law. 337
Disregarding this responsibility, the Trump Administration instead has
professed a commitment to full enforcement crackdown. In so doing, it has
failed to live up to the obligation to administer immigration law equitably.
Sanctuaries have stepped into the resulting equitable void. While critics have
charged that sanctuary policies subvert law, this Article has argued that they
present a valid and normatively defensible means of injecting legitimacy
norms, furthering due process values, and, above all, helping to avert at least
some disproportionate consequences.
Thus far there is anecdotal indication that religious sanctuaries
sometimes nudge the federal government to exercise proper equitable
discretion. 338 When it comes to sanctuary cities, however, the Trump
Administration has been less accommodating, perhaps because those
policies shield so many more potentially deportable noncitizens. The
Administration’s negative reaction is demonstrated by its efforts to withhold
federal funds from these jurisdictions and occasionally to undertake largescale enforcement activities specifically targeted at their residents. 339
The most ideal way forward would be for Congress to roll back the
severity and sweep of removal provisions and return adjudicative equitable
discretion to immigration and sentencing judges. While a return to robust
equitable prosecutorial discretion by federal enforcements represents a
second-best solution, the truth is that professional enforcers have always
been an imperfect fit as the primary site for applying law and equity to

337 Bowers, supra note 79, at 202 (arguing that moral arbitrariness generates costs to the legitimacy
of the removal system on par with the costs of legal errors).
338 See supra notes 283–86 and accompanying text (discussing the Vizguerra case and citing other
reports of sanctuary activities leading to favorable exercise of discretion by the federal government). In
this way, the federal government seems to interpret the efforts of religious sanctuaries on behalf of
deportable noncitizens as something like what I have termed “disproportionality rules of thumb.” Cade,
supra note 32, at 44–50.
339 See supra notes 202–05, 330 and accompanying text (discussing litigation surrounding the
withholding of funds from sanctuary cities and enforcement operations such as Operation Safe City that
suggest a pattern of revenge against sanctuary jurisdictions).
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determine the appropriate outcomes. 340 Enforcers are typically too busy, 341
and they are primarily tasked with conduct, not adjudication. 342
Despite the messy and antagonistic milieu in which sanctuaries have
arisen, they might help point the way to a better future of immigration
adjudication. Perhaps that future would include a formalized subfederal
government or community role in recommending against an individual’s
deportation on normative grounds or even in setting deportation policy more
generally. 343 For now, however, immigration reform remains hopelessly
gridlocked. Until those gears finally loosen, it falls to other actors in the
system to shape enforcement in a way that maintains the system’s legitimacy.
Although the Supreme Court’s recent immigration enforcement cases
do not involve sanctuaries, they nevertheless reveal the Court’s acceptance
and even endorsement of both federal and subfederal activities that inject
considerations of fairness and equity into the deportation scheme. Padilla,
for example, demonstrates the Court’s approval of state and local efforts to
reduce the possibility of inequitable removals. The lesson of Padilla,
Arizona, and other cases is critical in the context of thinking about sanctuary
efforts: equitable discretion, exercised either by enforcers or by others who
can influence outcomes, is both appropriate and necessary for the legitimacy
of the current removal system. 344

340 See, e.g., Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, supra note 31, at 693 (quoting Todd Starnes, ICE
NEWS
RADIO,
Agents:
Obama
Won’t
Let
Us
Arrest
Illegals,
FOX
http://radio.foxnews.com/toddstarnes/top-stories/exclusive-ice-agent-faces-suspension-for-arrestingillegal-alien.html [https://perma.cc/MU3C-FX2D] (reporting the President of the National ICE Council
Chris Crane’s view that ICE agents should “charge (the suspect) as being in the United States illegally
and let the judge sort it out. . . . That’s our place in the universe. . . . We’re supposed to make arrests and
let the judges and the legal system sort through the details”).
341 See Cade, supra note 5, at 50–54.
342 Bowers, supra note 79, at 147 (“Unlike the professional adjudicator, the professional law
enforcer[’s] . . . primary function is to take action—to engage in conduct.”); Thomas P. Crocker, The
Political Fourth Amendment, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 303, 319 n.90 (2010) (“Speaking for two bodies—the
police and lower courts—means that Court opinions must provide both decision rules to guide courts and
conduct rules to guide police.”); see also Nina Rabin, Victims or Criminals? Discretion, Sorting, and
Bureaucratic Culture in the U.S. Immigration System, 23 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 195, 210 (2014)
(arguing that the pervasive culture of enforcement within ICE prevents appropriate consideration of
equitable factors).
343 Cf. Morales, supra note 264, at 760 (arguing that the only politically feasible path to more humane
crime-based deportation is to make it a matter of local prerogative, because at least some localities would
take a more flexible and unconditional approach to noncitizen membership, while restrictionist
jurisdictions would also value more local control).
344 See also Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. 257, 275 n.10 (2012) (endorsing the idea that lawful
permanent residents might “negotiate a plea to a nonexcludable offense,” allowing them to travel outside
the United States without triggering immigration problems); Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1987
(2015) (explaining, with apparent approval, how the categorical approach allows defendants to enter “safe
harbor” plea deals that avoid unjust removals); Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 55–58 (2011) (holding

502

113:433 (2018)

Sanctuaries as Equitable Delegation

These considerations might inform courts adjudicating challenges to the
federal government’s attempts to withhold federal funding from sanctuary
cities. Courts might also limit the scope of criminal liability under the
harboring statute in certain situations where sanctuaries provide shelter or
other assistance to deportable noncitizens. 345 And if situations arise in which
harboring convictions cannot be avoided, courts might nevertheless impose
light sentences. 346 Through these and related measures, courts might protect
sanctuary efforts, curb some unfairness in the removal system, and signal to
the Executive that a reformulation of approach in immigration enforcement
is required. Ultimately, it may take a combination of sustained resistance by
subfederal entities and supportive court rulings to jolt the political branches
into doing the right thing. Until then, sanctuaries represent immigration
equity’s last stand.

that discretionary relief policies that fail to take into account the “alien’s prior offense or his other
attributes and circumstances” violate the Administrative Procedures Act).
345 See, e.g., Cruz v. Abbott, 849 F.3d 594, 602 (5th Cir. 2017) (“[T]here is no reasonable
interpretation by which merely renting housing or providing social services to an illegal alien constitutes
harboring . . . that person from detection.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
346 See Campbell, supra note 210, at 486 (discussing how no jail time was imposed following the
Operation Sojourner convictions in the 1980s).
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